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To protect the United States Supreme Court’s institutional status, justices
on the bench must grapple with threats to the Court’s authority. How do
members of the Supreme Court preserve their legitimacy? This thesis
employs a historical analysis to evaluate responses to legitimacy
challenges over time. Similar challenges impact the Supreme Court across
various eras. Judicial responses build upon each other, and develop a
stronger judiciary as time passes. In this light, I emphasize the historical
continuities within the actions of the Roberts Court. There are many prior
tools the current institution may implement to refill its reservoir of public
support.
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Introduction
In July of 2018, the United States Supreme Court faced an unusual yet familiar
challenge. Brett Kavanaugh, a DC Circuit Court of Appeals Justice at the time, became
President Trump’s nominee to replace Associate Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy (Tatum 2018). A few months following Kavanaugh’s nomination, Senator
Dianne Feinstein publicized allegations from an anonymous source stating that
Kavanaugh had sexually assaulted a woman in high school (Farrow and Mayer 2018).
The source, later revealed as Dr. Christine Blasey Ford, eventually stepped forward to
confirm her accusation and testify during Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing (Tatum
2018).
Feinstein’s revelation provoked immense outrage across political lines. On the
left, people were furious that someone accused of sexual assault would gain such
expansive powers over women’s rights. How could allegations of sexual assault not
disqualify a candidate for the highest court of the land? Did women’s rights issues mean
nothing to politicians (Ball and Berenson 2018)? On the right, people could not believe
that an allegation would bear such weight without evidence and due process. Were people
not “presumed innocent until proven guilty” (Rothman 2018)? Whatever happened to the
legal protections afforded to people through our Bill of Rights? No matter what political
background defined people’s opinions, many questioned the role of the Court and justices
as a result of Kavanaugh’s confirmation process. The circumstances of Kavanaugh’s

3

nomination brought forth a critical debate involving the Court’s impartiality throughout
the United States (Page 2018). Furthermore, the scenario captured the attention of the
media for quite some time.
Kavanaugh’s nomination and Feinstein’s revelation created a situation where the
Supreme Court would inevitably lose. Regardless of whether he was confirmed,
Kavanaugh’s confirmation process would likely stir some negative opinions of the
Supreme Court as an institution. One side would win, yet the other would lose. How
would people who approved of Kavanaugh react to the Court if he was denied a place on
it? How would people who disapproved of him feel if he gained such a critical role over
women’s rights? The bind created through Kavanaugh’s confirmation process indicated
high levels of polarization, and questioned the judiciary’s ability to function in such an
environment. Data conducted by YouGov noted that the issue was highly polarized, with
89% of Strong Democrats opposing Kavanaugh’s nomination, 86% of Strong
Republicans in favor of Kavanaugh’s nomination, and Independents falling near the
middle of the scale (Brady 2018). Because the issue was this partisan, it seemed
impossible for the Court to find an answer to resolve the losing party’s qualms.
Kavanaugh’s nomination exposed holes in the justices’ confirmation process, threatening
the role of the justices. There was no solution that worked well to alleviate doubts people
held about the Court’s ability to rise above politics.
If the Court faced either option, it would suffer from an impending threat to its
legitimacy. The Supreme Court’s legitimacy, defined as the “consensus on whether [the]
institution is worthy of our moral reason-based support” (Buchanan 2018), is what allows
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the Supreme Court to continue writing decisions. The words of the Court only matter as
long as people are willing to listen to them. This is the ultimate challenge of legitimacy
for the Supreme Court; the Court cannot reframe its legitimacy once it completely
vanishes. After the legitimacy of the Court is under suspicion, the justices must find a
way to recover authority so the Court may proceed with its duties. For example, after
Kavanaugh was confirmed, Justice Elena Kagan restated fears about the Supreme Court
losing legitimacy. In her words, “[p]art of the [C]ourt's legitimacy depends on people not
seeing the [C]ourt in the way that people see the rest of the governing structures of this
country now. . . . In other words, people thinking of the [C]ourt as not politically divided
in the same way, as not an extension of politics, but instead somehow above the fray”
(Page 2018). Debates over polarization have a way of impacting the Court’s so-called
impartial image it wants to project onto the public.
The impartiality which Justice Kagan references matters because the Court relies
on it for legitimacy. For the sake of appearing fair, the Supreme Court has an obligation
to remain impartial on matters before the bench. If the justices believe their impartiality
may be “reasonably questioned,” they have a duty to recuse themselves for a given case
(Ifill 2002). As Melissa Loewenstern explains, citing Archibald Cox, “the Supreme
Court’s decisions ‘are legitimate only when [the Court] seeks to dissociate itself from
individual or group interests, and to judge by disinterested and more objective
standards’” (Loewenstern 2003). If the justices serving on the bench appear partial, then
they harm the credibility of the decisions they issue. To ensure the Court remains
legitimate, the justices aim for impartiality in their decisions and their actions. This is
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especially certain for the Chief Justice, whose role concerns the entirety of the Court
(Biskupic 2019).
What is the big impact of legitimacy? Why are the justices so preoccupied with it,
and why does it matter in the context of the judiciary? Legitimacy gives the judiciary the
power to move people with words, to confer authority onto substantive issues and let the
justices hold power in their decisions (Gibson, Lodge, and Woodson 2014; Clawson,
Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001). People might take the Court’s legitimacy for granted, but
for the justices on the bench, legitimacy constitutes their profession. The justices remain
concerned with judicial legitimacy because the institution they work for depends on it to
thrive. Moments threatening the Court’s powers could impact the Court’s influence.
Challenges towards the Court’s authority serve as challenges to the Court’s legitimacy, by
consequence. Preserving the authority of the Supreme Court is a priority for the justices
as they confront different challenges to the branch’s decisions.
The situation arising out of Kavanaugh’s nomination made me question how the
Court responds to such challenges. In these dilemmas of legitimacy, it seems as though
the Court has few options to preserve its authority. How does the Court respond to
challenges to its legitimacy? More specifically, what can the Court do besides continue to
write and express the same opinions that are in question in the first place? This project
explores the Court’s methods for asserting its authority while under duress. There may be
a single, principal tool the Court has legal permission to use, but that does not mean there
is only one way to apply it. As the Court grapples with disputes over its powers, it
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ultimately faces the inherent question of legitimacy itself, including the flaws to
legitimacy as a concept.
To proceed about this set of questions, I will approach the topic of judicial
legitimacy in a few different ways. First, I will set up a background to judicial legitimacy
and why it matters. Chapter 1 will cover an in-depth analysis of the theories of legitimacy
and the issues that arise from this topic. Next, I will move into the cases themselves to
show the Court’s specific methodology. Chapters 2 through 6 develop five specific time
periods where the Court faced similar challenges to judicial legitimacy. Each chapter
covers historical factors influencing the challenges, as well as the Court’s responses.
What steps has the Court already taken to recuperate from a decrease in legitimacy, and
what were the specific outcomes? Finally, I will conclude with an analysis of the results
and what they might mean for the near future. The scope of this project is the responses,
yet its impact extends much further. My intention is to explain the significance of
legitimacy-based responses from the judiciary.
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Chapter 1: The Challenges of Legitimacy: A
Literature Review
Constitutional Background
The Supreme Court is, at its core, a legal entity. It derives its power from the
Constitution, and applies legal frameworks to carry out its duties (Gibson 2007, 23). As
the Court is an institution so heavily based in upholding the law, it logically relies at least
in part on the law to weigh legal issues. Other laws might manage the judiciary further,
but there is one principal document responsible for justifying the judiciary’s role. That
legal justification comes first and foremost through the United States Constitution
(Gibson and Nelson 2014). The Constitution establishes the Supreme Court’s legal
legitimacy, and serves a significant role in the Court’s legitimacy as a whole.
As the main structure of government in the United States, the Constitution
outlines the capacities of specific institutions and their respective powers. Article I
describes Congress, the legislative branch with the “power of the purse” (Gibson and
Nelson 2014). Congress directs funding when writing federal laws and statutes, and it
ultimately develops our laws. Article II outlines the role of the executive, with the “power
of the sword” (Gibson and Nelson 2014). The executive has the authority to both enforce
Congressional laws and manage the details of such laws. Then comes Article III, with a
noticeably smaller description of the Supreme Court and its roles in government. It
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establishes a national judiciary, but leaves most of the details of the Court’s role up to
future interpretation, although there are some implicit guidelines on how far the justices
might interpret judicial authority (Farganis 2012, 207).
Compared to the descriptions of the other branches, the Constitution’s analysis of
judicial power feels “close” to an afterthought, or something meant to be developed later.
(Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2017, 56). To start, the Constitution’s description of
the Court appears third in the series of articles describing the three branches. Placing
Article III as third makes the Court sound weaker than the other branches (U.S. Const.
1788). Furthermore, the first two articles carried lengthy sections on the strengths and
duties of the other branches of government. They delved into clear clauses for legislative
and executive powers, providing a descriptive construction of the first two pillars of
government. By contrast, the third article offered little explanation of what the judiciary’s
exact duties are meant to be. Article III of the Constitution frequently refers to the
“judicial power” of the institution (U.S. Const. 1788). Nonetheless, nowhere does the
document explicitly outline what this power entails, thus leaving the role of judicial
power up to societal interpretation (Fallon 2018). The Supreme Court may have
“Supreme” in its name, but there is a comprehensive gap present within our Constitution,
one which refuses to treat the Court with the same deference as the other branches. The
Supreme Court’s legal basis is one which questions the institution’s legitimacy by its
nature.
The Constitution’s missing explanation for “judicial power” has posed a dilemma
for Supreme Court scholarship over time. The authority of the Supreme Court supposedly
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“extend[s] to all [c]ases, in [l]aw and [e]quity” (U.S. Const. 1788). Yet why does the
extent of the Court’s power matter if the definition of that power itself remains unclear?
In the initial decades following the ratification of the Constitution, the Court grappled
with questions over its own legitimacy, due to inherent flaws within the Constitution. In
order to prove its right to impart decisions, it first needed to clarify which topics the
Constitution permitted it to address (Crowe 2012). In this regard, much of the
responsibility for depicting the Court’s institutional legitimacy fell on the shoulders of the
Court itself. If the justices did not collectively defend their capacity to decide on legal
matters, then who else would do so? Executive, legislative, and state powers seized
opportunities to question judicial power, and the justices were left with the task of
defending the judiciary (Barnett 2007). The justices are small in their singular responses
to challenges, but together, underneath the judicial authority of decision-writing, they
carry with them the capacity of the third branch. Without central opinions dictating the
role of the Supreme Court, there would be less evidence available for scholars to interpret
the Court’s legitimacy in the context of society.
Although the judiciary needed further development, it was already clear what
some of its role would entail (Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2017, 56). Over time,
and through the opinions of the Court, judicial power became recognized as the capacity
of the judiciary to interpret the laws of our nation. The abilities of the Court were further
specified in Marbury v. Madison (1803), which outlined the most important tool for the
Court: judicial review (Bartels and Johnston 2013). John Marshall’s decision crafted a
version of the Supreme Court with expanded powers, as original extensions of the
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Constitution did not conceive of a judiciary with this much control over both laws and
other branches of government (Fallon 2018). Through legal precedent and decisive
interpretation, Marshall was able to increase the Supreme Court’s legitimacy by
expanding on the constitutional meaning of “judicial power” (Graber 2003). As Marshall
wrote, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is” (Marbury v. Madison 1803). Marshall’s framework left a strong precedent for
the Court’s authority over laws, and one which continues to this day.
While the Supreme Court has actively grappled with questions over its authority,
one aspect of its legitimacy remains increasingly apparent: public perception shapes the
powers of the Court. The Court’s continued efforts to prove its power over our laws are
attempts at persuasion. The other branches of government have certain weapons they may
wield when someone raises a challenge to them. Through the power of the purse,
Congress may withhold funds from certain areas or pass laws against those who doubt
Congressional authority (Gibson and Nelson 2014). Therefore, Congress has tangible
authority. With the power of the sword, the executive may enforce certain laws more
harshly than others to assert its abilities (Gibson and Nelson 2014). The executive, then,
may directly impact real world problems. The judiciary, however, must depend upon the
strength of its words to defend itself. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in “Federalist 78,”
the Supreme Court has “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely [judgement]; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
[judgements]” (Hamilton 1788). There is a limited set of tools available to the Court in
the first place, tools which affect the Court’s supremacy in the eyes of the other branches.
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Hamilton’s reflection of the Supreme Court acknowledges a critical paradox for
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. The principal tool it would seem that the Court can
use to counter attacks is the same means under question in the first place: the Court’s
decision-writing process. If someone refuses to listen to the Court, then that individual is
raising a challenge to the Court’s ability to rule on our laws. Ultimately, then, the way the
Court fights back against this challenge is through a mechanism that presupposes people
who doubt the Supreme Court will come to listen to the Court again in the future. It
seems strange how the Court can simply expect other parties to begin to hear its opinions
again. Yet, so far, there have been no challenges to the Supreme Court’s authority that are
disastrous enough to completely destroy the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. Gibson
and Nelson write, “the Supreme Court does enjoy a ‘reservoir of goodwill,’ but that
reservoir is far from bottomless” (Gibson and Nelson 2014). A bottom to the reservoir, a
point in which support could dry up, does exist; yet the Court continues to enjoy enough
support to maintain itself over time. I would even go so far as to say no challenges have
been strong enough to serve as a full threat to the Court’s existence, especially in the
modern age. This paradox of legitimacy occurring in the sphere of public support plays a
significant role in discussions of Court legitimacy.

Theories of Legitimacy
Two crucial sides to the discussion on the Supreme Court’s legitimacy appear in
the section above. First is the legal angle. As an entity of the law, the Court partially
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relies on its legal justifications for legitimacy. A law-centric institution must find its roots
within the law to be able to wield the law as a tool. There must be a clear legal
justification for the Court to continue to exercise its judicial power. The second is the
public opinion angle. To reassert its authority, the Court feels the need to prove itself time
and time again as an institution worthy of the people’s approval, even if the people do not
care enough to listen. Disputes over institutional legitimacy often bring in a public
opinion-based analysis of the Supreme Court (Baird and Gangl 2006). If the Court loses
the respect of the people, then the institution loses its ability to write on critical social
decisions.
To theorize the parts played by these two sides of legitimacy, I follow two
theoretical subtypes of political legitimacy which already exist within the literature. The
first subtype of political legitimacy is normative legitimacy, or a “concept of political
legitimacy [that] refers to some benchmark of acceptability or justification” (Peter 2017).
This definition of legitimacy looks to the standards and legal justifications for political
power, such as our Constitution. Between judicial review from Marbury v Madison
(1803), Congressional acts over the judiciary, and judicial power granted through Article
III of the Constitution, the current Court has an arguably strong legal justification for its
right to exist and deliberate over legal matters. As noted above, though, not every aspect
of judicial authority appears within the Constitution. Thus, the judiciary needed to rely on
Congressional and judicial interpretations of its power to develop its role over time.
The second subtype of political legitimacy is descriptive legitimacy, or the
“people’s beliefs about political authority and, sometimes, political obligations” (Peter
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2017). This type of political legitimacy offers a de facto take on the Court, and one which
more directly matches the Court’s reality. The Supreme Court must strategically
maneuver through public opinion, as its actions or perceived biases can draw “vicious
and legitimacy-threatening criticism” (Gibson 2007). Any misstep which occurs within
the Supreme Court has the potential to create a political catastrophe, one which raises
questions not just about the role of the Court as an institution, but how it acquired its role.
If a threat is severe enough, it may also fuel questions about the validity of the
Constitution and the other branches. This is why the Court appears “keenly” aware of its
legitimacy as of late (Gibson and Nelson 2014). As of 2012, Dion Farganis notes that
Supreme Court opinions only reference institutional legitimacy 9 times in the 164 years
before Brown v. Board (1954), but over 71 references to legitimacy appeared in the
decades following Brown (Farganis 2012, 207). The Court is becoming increasingly
aware about the role that it plays with regard to public opinion.
Another way to characterize descriptive legitimacy is through a theory called the
reservoir of goodwill. This term appears briefly above, but it necessitates elaboration.
When discussing an institution’s legitimacy, scholars often refer to the metaphor of a
reservoir (Caldeira and Gibson 1992; Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Gibson and Nelson
2014; Grosskopf and Mondak 1998). James Gibson, one of the most extensive writers on
legitimacy of the Supreme Court, frequently references this theoretical framework
throughout his works. In this metaphor, the body of water symbolizes the general support
required for maintaining the political body. Just as water depletes from the “reservoir of
goodwill,” an institution can lose the respect and power it relies on to function (Gibson
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and Caldeira 2009). However, although the reservoir of goodwill can deplete over time, it
may also increase in size as public support for the institution refills. The water within the
reservoir acts as a measurement for the amount of descriptive legitimacy, or public
support, which the Court maintains. It is the larger picture of descriptive legitimacy,
which undergoes smaller changes over time.
For this metaphor for descriptive legitimacy, it is key to note the fluctuations that
appear within the reservoir of support keeping the Supreme Court afloat. Public opinion
may continuously reinforce the Court enough to keep it existing, but support for the
Court changes over time, largely as a result of the decisions the Court renders (Ball and
Berenson 2018). If the Court decides a case using ideas that go against the vein of public
opinion, it will often preemptively justify why the Court’s view should be preferred.
Public opinion, then, occasionally changes to align with the judicial perspective,
especially in highly salient cases (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001). Considering
that the public has not posed enough of a risk to drain the reservoir completely, the Court
seems more afraid of its own legitimacy than anyone else. Even though it is highly
unlikely that the Court would face a threat severe enough that it would establish a
constitutional crisis (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998; Gibson 2007), the judiciary often
reacts as though every challenge warrants a significant response (Farganis 2012, 213).
The Court defends itself time and time again as an entity with the right to weigh on
national laws.
Descriptive legitimacy and normative legitimacy link together when challenges in
one area affect the Court’s legitimacy in the other. While it is more rare for a normative
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attack to affect public opinion, a descriptive attack could have serious implications for the
normative standards protecting the Supreme Court. The flexibility of legal standards and
their impact on Supreme Court legitimacy make it “crucial for the Court to maintain a
reputation from the public as impartial, trustworthy, and above the politics and bargaining
characterizing Congress and the presidency” (Bartels and Johnston 2013). If the
reputation of the Supreme Court gets called into question, by the contrapositive, so do the
standards which permit it to operate in its current capacity. To go further into the impacts
of normative and descriptive legitimacy, the next two subsections will detail specifics of
the two factors. The literature supports a separation of the two categories, even if it is not
always explicit. Thus, a separation will occur for the rest of this project.

A Normative Analysis of Legitimacy
Analyzing the Court’s normative legitimacy sheds some light on a current
paradox for the Court’s reality. Scholarship both explains that the normative legitimacy of
the Court is strong enough to sustain it through attacks on the Court’s legitimacy
(Grosskopf and Mondak 1998), yet at the same time, the Court is constitutionally the
weakest or “least dangerous” of the three branches (Hamilton 1788; Gibson and Nelson
2014). On one hand, the judiciary has the potential to control society through its words.
On the other hand, the strength of the legal, judicial power still gets questioned. The
strong justifications for the Court’s right to write stem from constitutional and legal
precedents, but the Constitution itself questions the Court’s capacity compared to the
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other branches. These contradictions maintain themselves in discussions over judicial
legitimacy, developing a perplexing paradox. So which side is right? Is the Court strong
or weak on a normative level?
The Court’s normative legitimacy is strong, but part of that strength comes from
the Court’s acknowledgment of its own weaknesses. One of the reasons why the Court
need not fear normative attacks in the modern era is because of the fortified precedent the
Court has developed for itself after years of decisions, especially after the line of
precedent culminating in Marbury (Graber 2003). Nonetheless, occasionally the Court’s
precedent itself will use terminology that implies the Court is weak, either for strategy or
for acknowledgement (In re Neagle 1890). Even though the Supreme Court is considered
the least dangerous branch, it created a powerful source of precedent that allows it to
maintain legitimacy. Sometimes it is more beneficial for the Supreme Court to maintain
an unassuming position compared to the other branches.

A Descriptive Analysis of Legitimacy
Public opinion is a term which seems self-explanatory, but there are significant
nuances to its construction which warrant further discussion. Is “opinion” measurable
from person to person, and under what metrics? How can beliefs be quantified on an
objective scale? What does “the public” mean, and who does society count within this
term? Each of these questions complicate the notion of descriptive legitimacy, and make
it difficult to measure without error. This project recognizes some of the faults within
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public opinion, and their pertinence to legitimacy. As such, the primary goal of the thesis
emphasizes responses rather than public opinion measurements. The following
paragraphs will elaborate on tools for measuring public opinion which exist in the
literature, to provide a background on existing measurements for descriptive legitimacy.
Then, this section will extend further into some of the issues with trying to quantify
descriptive legitimacy for the Supreme Court.
One way to characterize descriptive legitimacy is through analyzing the different
types of support. The literature refers to two kinds of support for institutions: specific
support and diffuse support. Diffuse support refers to the general attitudes people hold of
an institution. On the other hand, specific support concerns the attitudes people have
about particular policies or outcomes (Caldeira and Gibson 1992). In other words, diffuse
support outlines the legitimacy of the Court as a whole, whereas specific support regards
the public opinion of the Court for a specific event. Diffuse support is the reservoir of
goodwill. The Supreme Court relies on diffuse support to keep it afloat despite attacks
from specific instances. This is the relationship between challenges to the Court’s
legitimacy and the Court’s legitimacy on a larger scale. The challenges come from
negative specific support, and their effect on legitimacy is their effect on the reservoir.
Several scholars question the exact impact that specific support has on diffuse
support, and develop different theories to analyze results. However, limitations remain for
analyses of descriptive legitimacy. Grosskopf and Mondak are a pair of scholars who
developed a method for measuring public opinion. They based their measurements on a
few different factors. First, they tracked media coverage of an issue, and opinion polls
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demonstrating awareness of a case. Then, they pursued the matter with three Harris polls,
and ran an ordered logistic regression analysis on the data (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998).
The limitations of this construction stem from the dependence on polls to accurately
represent the entirety of public opinion. Baird and Gangl conducted a simulated study of
Supreme Court decisions, where they separated respondents and gave different groups
various vignettes simulating Supreme Court decisions (Baird and Gangl 2006). The
limitations of this research method are similar to those of the previous one — it is difficult
to tell how representative the sample is of the total population. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
conducted a mass telephone survey to collect opinion data (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse
2001). Although there are various ways to collect opinions for research, it still remains a
challenge to quantify subjective beliefs into objective measurements. Regardless, there is
data out there through these measurements to represent public opinion, as opinion
remains one of the most important factors in understanding legitimacy.
The beliefs of the people play such a critical role in academic conversations over
the Court’s legitimacy that some authors theorize that public support creates an economy.
Grosskopf and Mondak, basing their perspective on the works of Jesse Choper, write that
“[s]upport for the Supreme Court acts as a form of political capital” (Choper 1980;
Grosskopf and Mondak 1998). Through this framework, the Court can “spend” its
reservoir of support to stand behind more controversial opinions (Grosskopf and Mondak
1998). Their way of framing support for the Court has a few intriguing implications: first,
it suggests that the Court may willingly deplete its own reservoir of support. Unlike some
other theories of legitimacy, which imply that the Court tries to increase its legitimacy at
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all costs (Gibson and Caldeira 2009), this theory suggests that the Court may benefit from
a minute decrease in its reservoir of public support. By establishing this framework,
Grosskopf and Mondak embrace the political side of the Supreme Court. They implicitly
argue that the Court does not work to distance itself from partisanship — rather it
embraces the political tools it can apply in partisan conflicts (Grosskopf and Mondak
1998). If this theory were true, these implications would make for a highly political,
interesting structure of government.
One problem remains true throughout discussions of public opinion in the United
States. The US has a terrible history of inequity and discrimination. Inequities within the
structure of the United States call into question descriptive and normative legitimacy as
frameworks and categories. Such an idealistic view of the Court that we see in political
and legal philosophy often misses the way that theories are applied in the world. “Public”
opinion depends on the nation’s definition of the public, and the US has a history for
disregarding people throughout its existence as a nation. As Juan Williams writes for
William and Mary’s Law Review,
“[Justice Thurgood] Marshall generated national headlines by telling his
audience that the Constitution ‘was defective from the start, requiring several
amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the
system of constitutional government and its respect for the individual freedoms
and human rights we hold as fundamental today’” (Williams 1992).

The Supreme Court Justice, Thurgood Marshall, was referring to the fact that the original
Constitution had ten clauses which “directly or indirectly recognized or secured slavery”
(Kaczorowski 2004). The same document responsible for giving authority to the Supreme
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Court rescinded rights from numerous individuals and prevented them from being seen as
members of the public.
Public support is necessary to determine judicial opinion, yet as the previous
paragraphs explain, it is difficult to measure. As Christian von Haldenwang writes,
“[o]bviously, a legitimate political order should enjoy widespread support” (von
Haldenwang 2017), but it is not just about the support of the majority that counts in a
“widespread” analysis. Support is going to be intersectional. Therefore, it is important to
note differences in perception of the Court, as a direct result of how the Court has reacted
to people over time. Inequities were present in the Constitution and in our laws in the first
place. The Court has grappled with these problems over time due to the fact that they are
written into the laws themselves. This influences specific parts of the Court’s descriptive
legitimacy.

Methodology
For my research, I applied elements from this literature review to a historical,
excerpt-based analysis of the Supreme Court. The terms stated above, such as normative
and descriptive legitimacy, provide a wider perspective on judicial history. Similar
challenges occur during specific, legitimacy-framed periods of the Supreme Court. For
instance, over several decades, the Court may experience similar threats to its role as an
impartial branch in government. Separating temporal challenges by common themes
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allows for greater opportunities to analyze and predict the reasoning behind judicial
responses to legitimacy challenges.
The case selection relied heavily on elements already present within scholarship. I
examined “cases,” both in the judicial and the analytical sense, as instances which
threatened the authority, or power, of the Supreme Court. The challenges mostly related
to the Court cases themselves, but occasionally included additional normative factors,
such as the confirmation process for justices. For the Supreme Court cases, the challenges
to legitimacy could occur before the case, within the case content, within the justices’
opinions, or in the aftermath of the case. The biggest influences on my case selection
were Crowe’s book Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional
Development, Gibson and Nelson’s 2014 article “The Legitimacy of the US Supreme
Court: Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto,” and my experiences as a
student and preceptor in Patrick Schmidt’s Constitutional Law class, using texts from
David O’Brien, and Gillman, Graber, and Whittington (Crowe 2012; Gibson and Nelson
2014; O’Brien 2017; Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2017). As I conducted further
research into the topic area, I added more cases onto my initial case selection.
Below is a list of some of the cases I considered in my preliminary research
(Table 1). I used this table as a guide for time groupings, as well as for future research.
The case table is, by no means, exhaustive. Rather, it demonstrates an excerpt of some
major cases where authority of the Court came into question. Through similarities
demonstrated in the table, I classified cases by common temporal trends.
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Table 1: Cases Representing Challenges to Legitimacy

Case

Facts

Challenge to
Legitimacy

Response

Impact

Chisholm v. GA (1793)

Chisholm sued
Georgia for
payment on goods

GA argued they
were a sovereign
state that did not
need to submit to a
decision from a
federal body
(Supreme Court)

Court clarified that
the individual states
still fall under federal
judiciary’s scope of
power

First significant case of
the Court’s history —
GA was still bound to
federal oversight.
Provoked a SEVERE
reaction from public
and led to 11th
Amendment

Ware v. Hylton (1796)
and Hylton v. US (1796)

Two cases
decided a day
apart on federal
and state laws
involving
money/taxing

Can the judiciary
review state laws?

Yes, state law was
struck down

Provoked antifederalist
fears and set the stage
for Marbury — the
Court could defer to
federal laws/powers to
overturn (state) laws

Calder v. Bull (1798)

Was a CT tax law
in violation of
constitutional
prohibition on ex
post facto laws?

Can the judiciary
review state laws?

Yes, but state law
was permitted

Supreme Court
provided the answer
necessary to expand
its power, but did so in
a way to avoid
criticism

Marbury v. Madison
(1803)

Adams to
Jefferson
presidency,
judgeships were
not delivered
(DUAL ROLE OF
MARSHALL), Role
of judiciary as
described in
Judiciary Act(s)

Can the judiciary
review federal laws
if they conflict with
the Constitution?

Yes, this falls within
Supreme Court
power

MAJOR case for
judicial power —
defined scope of
Article III provisions in
a way that propelled
Marshall’s Federalist
visions forward

US v. The William
(1808)

Several ships
were seized after
violating
Jeffersonian
embargo

Scope of judicial
review after
Marbury

(From federal district
court) judicial
authority extended
past Supreme Court
to other courts

Judicial review is not
the exclusive power of
the Supreme Court

Martin v. Hunter’s
Lessee (1816)

Virginia case over
land inheritance
and dispute. Land
confiscation
violates US and
British peace
treaties

Can the Supreme
Court issue a writ of
mandamus to force
Virginia’s Court of
Appeals to
reconsider its
decision through
the Judiciary Act of
1789?

Yes — Supreme
Court can control
higher state courts

Virginia (begrudgingly)
followed through and
Congress sided with
the Supreme Ct.,
refusing to repeal that
section of the Judiciary
Act

McCulloch v. MD (1819)

Federal ability to
make a (second)
national bank, and
states’ ability to
tax it

Extent to which the
Court can extend
powers of the other
branches, and rule
on matters
concerning the
other branches

Supreme Court can
weigh in on this
case, and give
Congress expanded
powers through
“Necessary and
Proper” Clause

Supreme Court has
the duty to determine
the powers of other
branches of
government when in
conflict with laws
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Cohens v. VA (1821)

Cohen brothers
sold lottery tickets
between DC and
VA

Are states final
arbiters of conflicts
between state and
federal
governments? Or
does this power lie
in another entity
(the courts)

No — this falls
within judicial power

A “keystone” for
judicial power (Crowe
pg. 94)

Worcester v. GA
(1832)

Ability of Georgia
to enter into
Cherokee lands
(as designated by
treaties)

(Posed after the
fact) — ability of the
Court to enforce
their own decisions
(Jackson’s quote)

Court continues
writing decisions, as
if nothing happened

Jackson’s words made
arguably the most
threatening attack on
the Court’s legitimacy

Dred Scott v. Sanford
(1857)1

Dred Scott, a
slave, argued for
his freedom before
the Court after
crossing lines into
a free state

How does the Court
balance highly
polarized Court
cases with
constitutionality,
especially when the
Constitution
diminishes some
people’s rights
(similarly to Prigg)?

Court balanced
constitutionality with
keeping peace
between Northern
and Southern states

Court managed to
maneuver through
public opinion, but this
came at the cost of
writing a decision that
eventually was viewed
as one of the worst
ones in the history of
precedent regarding
human rights issues

Prize Cases (1863)

Lincoln’s blockade
of Southern ships
during the Civil
War; ships were
looted for
“prizes”/bounties

How the political
makeup of the
Court affects its
decisions; role of
the Court during
war/martial law

Decided a favorable
outcome for Lincoln.
(Less explicit as a
response)

Quietly affected how
people perceived the
Court

Hepburn v. Griswold
(1870) and Legal
Tender Cases (1871)

Two cases over
federal forms of
money to replace
different state
monetary units

Court’s ability to
maintain precedent
and expand
governmental
powers

Legal tender cases
overturned Hepburn,
reverting back to
McCulloch’s
precedent for
expansive powers

Anytime a decision
overturns another, the
new one carries just
as much force as any
other case would

In re Neagle (1890)

A Supreme Court
justice is
appointed a
bodyguard by the
president because
of an extensive
feud with a former
friend

*Self-challenge*
Does the Court
depend on the other
branches for
enforcement of its
powers?

Yes — judiciary
relies on the
executive to protect
it; it is a weak
branch

Judiciary themselves
consider their powers
weak without support
from the other
branches

Plessy v. Ferguson
(1895)

Jim Crow laws,
especially when
race is so much of
a spectrum

Court’s role in
deciding cases
based on public
opinion and
constitutionality

8-1 decision against
Plessy; Harlan’s
dissent (which still
was problematic, but
at least it argued for
an increase in
rights)

In the future, looked
down upon as a
disgrace of the Court,
but unfortunately this
decision matched what
public opinion thought
at the time

Lochner v. NY (1905)

Bakers/working

(From a

Case eventually

Lochner Era continues

1

For the sake of accuracy, I will be referring to the Dred Scott case as “Dred Scott v. Sanford” (1857). The
Court reporter mis-typed Sanford’s name on the case document as “Sandford” (Gillman, Graber, and
Whittington 2017, 215), and scholarship refers to the case in both ways (Crowe 2012; Gillman, Graber, and
Whittington 2017).
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conditions; state
ability to regulate
labor under police
powers

future-based
perspective) —
validity of the Court
considering this
decision

overturned

until New Deal Era

Schechter v. US (1935)

NIRA — New Deal
policy about
Congress
delegating powers
to executive and
industries.
Schechter
brothers violated
fair competition
standards

Role of the Court in
New Deal times/era
of transition

Supreme Court
refuses to budge for
FDR’s New Deal
policies

FDR proposes a plan
to pack the Supreme
Court

NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co.
(1937)

New Deal policy
concerning
regulations

Role of the Court in
New Deal times/era
of transition

Supreme Court
changes its opinion,
allows FDR’s
expansive policies
and saves itself from
FDR’s Court-packing
plan

The Court continues
as it was without
additional members
added by a
Court-packing plan

Korematsu v. US (1944)

Japanese
internment camps

(Future-based) How
the Court handles
discrimination

Argued that this was
within the power of
the federal
government

Became another
notorious case of
shame for the Court

Brown v. Board (1954)

Racial segregation
in schools

The Supreme Court
led the trend
against public
opinion — how the
Court handles its
legitimacy when it is
right and the public
is wrong

Unanimous decision
for desegregating
schools — the
impact of changing
the Chief Justice

Supreme Court guided
public opinion on this
matter

Brown v. Board II
(1955)

Racial segregation
in schools

The Supreme Court
led the trend
against public
opinion — how the
Court handles its
legitimacy when it is
right and the public
is wrong

Unanimous decision
for desegregating
schools

Supreme Court guided
public opinion on this
matter

Cooper v. Aaron
(1958)

Racial segregation
in schools

The Supreme Court
led the trend
against public
opinion — how the
Court handles its
legitimacy when it is
right and the public
is wrong (and no
one’s been
listening). Is the
Court’s word the
law?

Unanimous decision
for desegregating
schools — written in
a different way than
unanimous, &
Frankfurter’s
concurrence

Supreme Court
reasserted its
authority, and the
justices proclaimed
that the Court’s
decisions become the
law

Griswold v. CT (1965)

Contraceptives

Does the Court only
need to stick to
outlined principles

Penumbral rights =
implied by other
provisions (including

The Court granted
another liberal
decision in favor of
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in the Constitution?

privacy) as a part of
substantive due
process

rights, arguing that the
right to privacy
covered
contraceptives too. Set
the stage for Roe v.
Wade (1973)

US v. US District Court
(1972)

Surveillance of US
citizens without a
warrant

How far does
judicial power
extend?

Surveillance needs
a warrant signed by
a judge to be
constitutional.
Carried through the
importance of the
judiciary

The courts continued
to advocate for
themselves in nearly
every opportunity

Roe v. Wade (1973)

Abortion legality

Does the Court only
need to stick to
outlined principles
in the Constitution?
How does the Court
withstand attacks
from public opinion?

Penumbral rights =
implied by other
provisions (including
privacy) as a part of
substantive due
process. Abortion
falls within this
scope

Conservatives use this
as a key issue for why
they need the
presidency to control
the Court

US v. Nixon (1974)

Nixon’s tapes
post-Watergate:
whether or not he
needed to release
them to the Court
for the criminal
trials of his
conspirators

How far does
judicial power
extend?

Carried through the
importance of the
judiciary on a
separate issue

The courts continued
to advocate for
themselves in nearly
every opportunity

US v. Richardson
(1974)

Taxpayer’s interest
in government
spending of taxes

The continuation of
Marbury after
industrial times

Powell’s
concurrence —
potent power of
Marbury (Lasser pg.
3)

The legacy of Marbury
still continues today

INS v. Chadha (1983)

Immigration case
affected by
legislative veto

Judicial elimination
of legislative veto
(used in over 200
cases) is practically
ignored

Judiciary does not
push back against
people ignoring its
decision for the sake
of efficiency

The judiciary both
managed to show that
the issue was not
constitutional while
also allowing
something procedural
to continue for the
sake of efficiency

Planned Parenthood
v. Casey (1992)

Abortion case

The constitutionality
of the precedent of
Roe v. Wade (1973)

Roe v. Wade (1973)
is the law as
precedent; “[t]he
Court must take
care to speak
and act in ways that
allow people to
accept its decisions
on the terms the
Court claims for
them, as grounded
truly in principle . . .
Thus, the Court's
legitimacy depends
on making legally
principled decisions

Justices are aware of
their own legitimacy,
and must balance
keeping precedent
with maintaining public
support
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under circumstances
in which their
principled character
is sufficiently
plausible to be
accepted by the
Nation” (Concurring
opinion)

Gonzales v. Raich
(2005)

Medical marijuana
provision by CA in
conflict with
federal law
prohibiting
marijuana

Consistency of
judges; what to do
when federal laws
and state laws
conflict

Struck down medical
marijuana laws in
CA, but stayed quiet
when these types of
laws resurfaced later
(CO recreational
marijuana
legalization followed
by others)

States as testing labs
— the Court can let
political bodies ignore
its previous decisions

Citizens United v. FEC
(2010)

Super PACs

Ability of the Court
to render a
bipartisan decision
in a polarized
matter

5-4 decision by
Roberts giving
victory to
conservatives —
campaign finance =
speech

Gave the illusion of
impartiality

NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)

Highly contentious
Obamacare case

Ability of the Court
to render a
bipartisan decision
in a polarized
matter

4-1-4 decision with
Roberts’s opinion
switching/allowing a
partial liberal victory

Gave the illusion of
impartiality

Obergefell v. Hodges
(2015)

Gay marriage
case

Ability of the Court
to render a
bipartisan decision
in a polarized
matter — how the
Court can appease
polarized opinions
while also
administering rights

5-4 decision with
Kennedy switching
sides

Gave the illusion of
impartiality

Trump v. Hawaii (2018)

Trump’s travel ban

Ability of the Court
to render a
bipartisan decision
in a polarized
matter
(post-Trump’s
election)

5-4 decision by
Roberts giving
victory to
conservatives —
injunction removed,
but Korematsu also
officially overturned

Gave the illusion of
impartiality

Sessions v. Dimaya
(2018)

Immigration case
— deportation of
lawful permanent
residents

Ability of the Court
to render a
bipartisan decision
in a polarized
matter
(post-Trump’s
election)

5-4 decision with
Gorsuch’s opinion
switching/allowing a
liberal victory

Gave the illusion of
impartiality

Rucho v. Common
Cause (2019)

Partisan
Gerrymandering

Ability of the Court
to render a
bipartisan decision
in a polarized
matter

Tense 5-4 decision
along party lines

Outrage toward the
Supreme Court
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(post-Trump’s
election)

Now that I have outlined the extent to which I selected cases as challenges to
legitimacy, I will begin my historical analysis of the five periods I designated for the
United States Supreme Court. These temporal groupings are based on similar challenges
to legitimacy, and often extend across vast swaths of time otherwise reserved for more
specific judicial contexts. I found five distinguishable legitimacy periods throughout my
research. The first, the Early National Period, was a time when the Court constructed its
own authority. This period ran from the late 1780s to the early 1830s, and is the subject
of the following chapter. The next period, the Civil War Era, includes three smaller
periods, each surrounding unity during the Civil War. The smaller periods are the
Antebellum, the Civil War itself, and the Reconstruction Period. The third era of
legitimacy challenges, the New Deal Transition Period, ran from the end of the Lochner
Era to the beginning of the New Deal Era. It covered the Court’s resistance to a massive
progressive shift from the public and other branches. The fourth period is the
Desegregation Period, from the 1950s to the 1960s. During that time, the Warren Court
faced similar threats to its stance on desegregation. Finally, there is the Modern Court
Era, a time spanning across the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. The Modern Court Era has
included a number of threats from partisanship in the midst of polarization and new
technologies. I will now begin my analysis with Chapter 2, on the first period for
legitimacy: the Early National Period.
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Chapter 2: Leadership in the Early National
Period
The Early National Period is distinguishable through the frequent normative
challenges the Supreme Court faced towards its authority.2 Normative, authority-based
issues, when severe enough, morphed into descriptive, public attacks, as demonstrated in
Chisholm v. Georgia (1793). This period extends from the creation of the Constitution to
somewhere in the mid-1830s, as Marshall’s tenure ended and Jackson assumed the
presidency. During the Early National Period, the justices served Federalist purposes by
seeking expansion of the federal judiciary. Each challenge offered the bench a chance to
gain further powers. The justices of the Early National Period worked together against
normative challenges to build themselves up.
Despite the implied unity behind the decisions of “the Court,” the Court is
composed of individual justices. Each justice makes contributions to the decision of the
Court as a whole. Yet, ultimately, it is the contribution of the leader, the Chief Justice,
that frequently bears the most weight in a decision. In their decisions, the Chief Justices
in the Early National Period dictated the importance of the Court for the sake of
legitimacy. They remain responsible for the expansive interpretation of the judiciary that
we witness today. John Jay, the first Chief Justice, and John Marshall, the fourth Chief
Justice, were key figures in the early debates over the judicial authority (Barnett 2007).

2

This chapter is heavily based on a paper I wrote in junior year, titled “Marbury v. Madison: A Play of
Politics” for the class “From Confederation to Confederacy: US History from Independence to Civil War,”
taught by Professor Linda Sturtz.
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These two leaders developed the strength of the national judiciary through a few critical
decisions, ones which determined the normative role of the Court over time.

Historical Factors
In its initial stages, the role of the United States judiciary was unclear. The
Constitution spoke of an extensive “judicial power,” yet it did not specify its context
(U.S. Const. 1788). The Supreme Court’s Early National Period was a time for defining
the role of the judiciary. As political feuds broke out between the federalists and
antifederalists, who later formed the Federalist and Democratic-Republican parties, the
Court had to balance political opinions with judicial authority at the same time (Graber
1998).3 Thus, even with Federalist justices serving on the Supreme Court, the Court still
had to resolve governmental disputes under the guise of fairness. The justices could not
overtly favor Federalist principles within Court cases without threatening their capacity
to decide on these matters in the first place.
The federalists, a group including Hamilton, Washington, Marshall, Jay, Madison,
and Adams, advocated for centralized national government during the time surrounding
the Revolutionary War (Graber 1998). They wanted to increase taxes, expand industry,
and unite the individual states under the rule of a cohesive federal power. A few members
of the federalists, John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, authored the

3

For the sake of clarifying the different meanings of “Federalist,” I will refer to the federalist movement
from the Revolutionary War period with a lowercase “f,” and the Federalist political party that grew from it
with a capital “F.” I am also using “Democratic-Republicans” to refer to Jefferson’s party, which appears
under many names in texts.
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Federalist Papers through the pseudonym “Publius,” referring to a voice “of the people”
in Latin (Lee III 1997). On the other side stood the antifederalists. The antifederalists,
including Jefferson, wanted agrarian-based, local governance through state sovereignty
(Moskowitz 2017). They were apprehensive of centering vast power into a single,
national structure. After escaping the tyranny of the British monarchy, they did not want
to fall into yet another oppressive scheme of government. Given that representatives “are
no less human or corruptible than their electors,” antifederalists viewed federalist efforts
as an imitation of the British, tyrannical rule they just escaped (Johnson 2004). Thus, a
few members of the antifederalists argued against the Federalist Papers with the
Anti-Federalist Papers, authored by “Brutus” and others (Lee III 1997). Even after the
Revolutionary War ended, the ideas behind each party continued into the lines of thought
guiding political parties and conversations, as the groups became the Federalists and
Democratic-Republicans.
In the late 1790s, the Federalists suffered from a massive rift in the political party.
Hamiltonian Federalists and Adams Federalists parted ways over several disputes in the
late 1790s. Divisive lines appeared “between Federalist politicians who were primarily
concerned with promoting business enterprise and Federalist politicians who were more
concerned with the needs of commercial agriculture” (Graber 1998). Hamilton
represented one cohort and Adams the other. The two already disliked each other after the
1796 election, when Hamilton made it apparent he preferred Adams’s opponent,
Pinckney, over Adams (Houpt 2013, 148). Yet Hamilton and Adams hated each other
more as the split worsened among their followers over time (Graber 1998). The division
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tore at the otherwise unified Federalist party, and gave the Democratic-Republicans a
chance to fight back against Federalist control. Disputes over war and the Alien and
Sedition Acts of 1798 continued to weaken Adams’s presidency, leaving him open to a
challenge in 1800 (Bradburn 2008). All these factors cost Adams his bid for re-election
and put Jefferson into the presidency (Kerber 1970). Therefore, it is important to note that
not only did divisions worsen between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, but other
rifts seeped into the distinct political parties themselves.
While the Federalists were dealing with their own divisions, a larger dispute arose
between the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. The first election of the 19th
century marked the first time that the presidency “peacefully” switched from the control
of the Federalists to the control of the Democratic-Republicans (History.com Editors
2019). All of the tension that had been building between antifederalist and federalist
ideology finally boiled over when the Federalists lost the election. Furthermore, the
Federalists in the House were the ones who got to pick which Democratic-Republican
candidate they preferred out of Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson (Coblenz 2006), so in a
way, they still had the final word over the election. It is ironic that the description of the
transition is “peaceful” considering the “[v]icious partisan warfare [that] characterized
the campaign of 1800” (History.com Editors 2019). Shortly after Jefferson’s victory, the
Adams administration “rushed to consolidate power” in the last period before Jefferson’s
presidency began (Moskowitz 2017).
The parties and presidents continued changing throughout the Early National
Period, yet the same guiding principles for the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans
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extended into newer forms of politics. Regardless of which political parties dominated
the political sphere at a given time, they each reflected similar disputes over national and
state governance. As Graber explains, “Jeffersonians give birth to Jacksonians, and the
proto-Whigs who supported John Quincy Adams in 1824 and 1828 are the direct political
descendants of the Federalists who supported John Adams in 1796 and 1800” (Graber
1998). Throughout the Early National Period, there continued to be arguments over
where power should lie within our governmental structure. This is why the Supreme
Court faced more severe normative challenges to legitimacy during this epoch. Each
challenge raised to the Court’s ability to decide a matter was based on the existing
constitutional precedent to do so. If the justices argued against their capacity to render
certain decisions, they would appear weak, as if their words did not matter. This is why
the Court kept pushing for expansive abilities in the first several decades of its existence.
Legitimacy was linked to Federalist extensions of judicial power in the Early National
Period.

Challenges to Supreme Court Legitimacy
Decisions in the Early National Period carefully maneuvered across a rift in
political thinking. The constant struggle between federalist and antifederalist thought
persisted well after the end of the Revolutionary War. Most of the challenges that the
Court faced in the Early National Period concerned the level of power the national
government should hold during this “experiment of [C]onstitutional [D]emocracy”
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(Crowe 2012). Thus, by extension, several of the decisions from the Supreme Court
implicitly or explicitly questioned the level of power the Supreme Court should hold as a
federal entity. As the Court ruled on matters surrounding its own powers, it found
creative ways to broaden its abilities while seeming unbiased.
Cases arising between the federal government and individual states posed one of
the largest risks to the federal judiciary. This is because antifederalist and Jeffersonian
principles advocated for state rights. In Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), one of the first major
cases of the Court, Georgia argued that it did not need to appear before the Supreme
Court because it was a sovereign state, and therefore not subject to the rulings of federal
control (Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2017, 159). The dispute over who holds
power, the federal government or the states, found its way to the federal judiciary. The
Supreme Court is not only a federal court, it is the highest court in the land. For a state
court to argue against the authority of federal courts posed a risk to the Supreme Court
and the other federal branches. The judiciary needed to emphasize its larger role in
response to Georgia, or else it would lose its ability to weigh on larger cases. This is why
the preliminary challenge of Chisholm was so severe.
Then there was a series of smaller cases, each building up to a more serious
question of judicial review. Ware v. Hylton (1796), Hylton v. US (1796), Calder v. Bull
(1798), and Cooper v. Telfair (1800) were also challenges to judicial authority, but the
impact they had on legitimacy was smaller than that of Chisholm or Marbury. The early
justices assumed some version of judicial review would be within their scope of powers,
but they did not know what entirely that would entail (Fallon 2003, Footnote 5). The four
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cases, Ware, Hylton, Calder, and Cooper, pushed the Court to elaborate further on its
own capacity. The legitimacy challenges were inherent, as the cases concerned questions
over the judiciary itself. The Supreme Court, then, could build on each case as they
appeared, and use them to implicitly fuel judicial review arguments (Currie 1982, 655).
The challenges paved the way for a greater one to develop in the beginning of the 19th
Century, with a case about the 1800 election.
The events that followed Jefferson’s election appeared before the Supreme Court
in Marbury v. Madison (1803). Marbury was a political minefield. Not only did the case
concern the first time a president lost his reelection bid, it was the first time the
incumbent party lost to a new party. In the final day before the Jeffersonian presidency
began, John Adams created 42 Justice of the Peace positions to be filled by Federalist
judges (Moskowitz 2017). The justices would each have five-year terms, so long as they
received the seal of approval from Adams’s current Secretary of State, John Marshall
(Bloch 2001). Marshall was only able to approve 25 of the judgeships before Jefferson
assumed the presidency (Moskowitz 2017). After Jefferson took control, he replaced
John Marshall with James Madison as the Secretary of State, who immediately stopped
delivering judgeships (Balkin and Levinson 2003). Of the 17 people who did not receive
their commission, only four were enraged, including William Marbury (Moskowitz
2017). Marbury brought this dispute to the Supreme Court, requesting a writ of
mandamus from the Court, or an order commanding Madison to deliver the judgeships
(Moskowitz 2017). Marbury’s choice to ask the Supreme Court was odd since he could
have also brought it to the DC Circuit Court, and likely received a more favorable
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outcome (Bloch 2001). Perhaps one of the reasons why he brought the suit directly to the
Supreme Court is because of the Federalist, former Secretary of State John Marshall, who
now served as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Bloch 2001).
The question before the Supreme Court in Marbury was based on the facts of the
case. Did Marbury deserve his judgeship commission? According to the facts of the case,
the commission was signed and sealed, just not delivered (Balkin and Levinson 2003).
Time was what ultimately prevented commission delivery. However, there was another
question hiding within that issue, one which implicitly challenged the legitimacy of the
Court. That second question was whether or not the Supreme Court was the right actor to
remedy the situation (Marbury v. Madison 1803). As Balkin and Levinson also
acknowledge,
“there is more than one way to state what happened in Marbury, and thus what
constitute its ‘facts.’ Depending on what one thinks the facts of Marbury are, the
case is either, on the one hand, a symbol of judicial independence and the
separation of law from politics, or, on the other, a revealing case study in the
inevitable influence of politics on judicial decisionmaking demonstrating the
inability of courts fully to separate law from politics even as they repeatedly
attempt to disguise this fact in their own judicial rhetoric” (Balkin and Levinson
2003).

There are several pieces to Marbury v. Madison (1803), including factors which
threatened the legitimacy of the Court. The Court had three principal tasks: first, it had to
appear free from Federalist bias; second, it had to assert its authority; finally, it had to
accomplish both of the latter tasks in a way that would make people listen. Each of these
in itself seemed impossible, but the combination of the three in Marbury made the case a
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deadly constitutional conundrum. Any misstep could have severe effects on how people
would interpret the Court’s constitutional role in government.

The Court’s Responses
In the Early National Period, the challenges were connected by a common,
normative thread with descriptive implications. The justices’ responses, however, had
more variation as the Court learned from its previous mistakes. Under the first four
chiefs, the responses of the judiciary altered between pushing forward and strategic
retreat. After early Supreme Court cases failed to develop greater judicial powers, the
judiciary applied gradual responses, retreating and advancing further as necessary. This
strategy permitted Federalists to succeed in the judiciary. As time increased, the Supreme
Court became more forceful with the ways it developed judicial power out of challenges
to normative legitimacy.
The Supreme Court’s response in Chisholm was strong advocacy for its own
power. It ruled that states did indeed need to respect the authority of the Court and appear
in suits brought forward by private citizens (Crowe 2012). Each of the justices in the
majority wrote an opinion on this case, with Chief Justice John Jay’s opinion praising
“popular sovereignty” (Barnett 2007, 1734). According to Jay, our democracy was meant
to respect the will of the people as the sovereign of our nation. The United States was
built on principles of democratic rule, therefore its branches of government ought to
adhere to those same rules. This response made Jay seem like he was not advocating for
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increased power because of his own role. Rather, he thought the people would stand
behind his own Federalist principles.
While Chisholm’s attempt to expand Court authority narrowed the Supreme
Court’s power in scope, the cases shortly thereafter were more successful in enhancing
judicial powers. Ware v. Hylton (1796), Hylton v. US (1796), and Calder v. Bull (1798)
developed future arguments for judicial review, and set the stage for Marbury v. Madison
(1803). These smaller cases concerned the Court’s ability to review state and federal
laws, and some scholars, including Mark Graber, believe that these cases were among the
first examples of judicial review appearing in United States case law (Graber 2003). The
accumulating precedent for the Court’s expanding powers began to send the message that
the Court would do whatever necessary not just to protect its powers, but to increase
them. Through judicial responses to other cases, the Court demonstrated that it acted as a
Federalist stronghold by nature, as it worked to increase federal control over the states.
In responding to Marbury v. Madison (1803), John Marshall had a difficult job.
Due to his personal ties to the case, his Federalist opinions, and his purportedly unbiased
role as a justice, it seemed impossible to render a decision on this matter. If Marshall
deferred to Marbury and the Federalists, it would make him seem like a political
transplant. As Professor William van Alstyne explains, “[t]hough [Marshall] wrote for a
unanimous court . . . he was widely criticized to the point of concern lest he be
impeached” for his political role in the case (Van Alstyne 1969). Yet if Marshall refused
the mandamus, it would imply that the Court never had the power to deliver the
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judgeships in the first place. Either option he picked would propagate harmful images of
the Court.
There was also the pre-existing hatred between Jefferson and Marshall to
consider. Marshall felt an “almost insuperable objection” towards his distant relative, and
thought Jefferson was “totally unfit for the chief magistracy of a nation” (Marshall 1801;
Urofsky 2006). The feeling was mutual. Jefferson made it clear to Marshall that if the
Supreme Court forced the executive branch to comply and deliver the judgeship, then
Jefferson would override the command and ignore the judiciary. Professor Winfield Rose,
from Murray State University, specifies,
“[n]otwithstanding that Marshall should have recused himself, he knew that if he
issued the writ Jefferson would, at a minimum, direct Madison not to comply,
and thereby embarrass him and the Court” (Rose 2003).

Jefferson waged a “war on the judiciary” after the efforts Adams took to put more
Federalists in power (Rose 2003). Delivering the writ of mandamus would risk making
the Court look weak, but so would refusing to do so. Either way, the Supreme Court
stood to lose some of the authority it relied on to keep writing decisions.
This is why John Marshall’s response in Marbury expresses such a high level of
legal mastery. Marshall not only managed to refrain from looking weak as the Chief
Justice, but he enhanced the power of the Supreme Court for centuries to come. He
avoided siding with the Federalists, yet he also avoided giving Thomas Jefferson a
victory over the judicial branch (Rose 2003). In every possible way, Marshall delivered a
winning decision. Marshall first stated that William Marbury was entitled to a
commission. Marbury was nominated and appointed, his commission sealed and signed.
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Thus, the executive withholding of a commission was “an act . . . violative of a vested
legal right” (Marbury v. Madison 1803). Through his construction of a legal right to a
judgeship, Marshall was able to recognize the standing of his political ally.
Where Marshall diverged from Marbury was with the role of the Supreme Court.
Marshall argued that although Marbury deserved remedy for the undelivered judgeship,
the Supreme Court was not the right entity to provide it (Marbury v. Madison 1803). This
is because the specific section of the Act that granted the Court this authority was
inconsistent with the Constitution. Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which, as
Mark Graber writes, “did far more than Marbury v. Madison to establish judicial power in
the United States” (Graber 2003). Marshall made a statement on the Court’s power by
sacrificing the Court’s authority to issue a mandamus on the executive. In its place, the
Court gained the stronger power of judicial review. It was a “strategic retreat” enacted to
“enable the Supreme Court to nullify legislation for the first time,” in an expansive
measure that fit with Marshall’s political ideology (Lemieux 2003; Graber 1998). Even if
Marbury v. Madison (1803) was not the first Supreme Court case to use judicial review, it
became known as the most important case for this judicial power due to the constitutional
lessons it provides.

Impact of the Responses
The general impact of each Chief Justice’s responses is the same — the judiciary
provided stepping stones for the Court to build authority after each normative challenge.
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Jay’s response was strong, although it appeared at the wrong time. Incremental increases
in power between Chief Justice Jay and Chief Justice Marshall eventually allowed
Marshall to construct a judiciary with greater legitimacy. The justices’ responses to
threats served as precedent for one another, until Marbury v. Madison (1803) opened the
doors for stronger federal control.
In defiance to Jay’s call for “popular sovereignty,” the popular response to the
Court’s decision in Chisholm was massive public outrage. Citizens within the states
feared the power of this looming federal entity. How could states maintain their
sovereignty if they had to bend to the will of other powers? Georgia’s response to the
Supreme Court was mild because it saw another way out of this predicament. The State
adhered to the Court’s ruling while fighting against it with another constitutional tool, the
amendment making process. Chisholm’s holding was reversed a mere two years after the
case, with the passage of the 11th Amendment (Barnett 2007, 1737). The same popular
sovereignty that the Chief Justice worked to uphold wanted the Court to ironically have
less power. Chief Justice Jay worked to maintain the authority of the Court. Yet the steps
he took to do so ended up diminishing the legitimacy of this institution.
Luckily for Justice Jay, there was minimal impact of the 11th Amendment after its
passage. The amendment was carefully worded to only apply to “two specific
circumstances” (Barnett 2007, 1746). However, the minimal influence of the 11th
Amendment was not something that Jay could know at the time of its passage. Chief
Justice John Jay resigned in 1795 because he thought it was futile to fight for the
legitimacy of the Court. After serving as the Chief Justice, Jay thought the “Supreme”
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Court was “so defectively designed that it lacked ‘energy, weight, and dignity’” to
support itself (Bloch 2001, Footnote 7). His misstep in Chisholm shaped the way he
viewed the Court’s potential. If the public could not agree to federal judicial power, then
how could the justices render effective decisions? Other cases had further precedent to
back them up, but Chisholm created a backbone for future cases, albeit a weak one. This
is why the Court both succeeded and failed to support its legitimacy in Chisholm v. GA
(1793).
The Court’s efforts to increase its authority after Chisholm v. GA (1793) did not
go unnoticed by the divided public, especially those who were once antifederalists. As
Justin Crowe writes,
“Ware and Hylton suggested that the Anti-Federalists’ fear, articulated since the
Philadelphia Convention, that the Court would wield its power unevenly by
simultaneously deferring to federal law and attacking state law[,] was not
without merit” (Crowe 2012, 55).

The Supreme Court accumulated power with each ability granted to it, just as
antifederalists warned in “Anti-Federalist 78” from Brutus XV,
“[the authors of the Constitution] have made the judges independent, in the
fullest sense of the word. There is no power above them, to control any of their
decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they cannot be
controlled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the
people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this
situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself”
(Brutus 1788).

While there is currently a power capable of removing the justices from office (U.S.
Const. 1788), the antifederalists were right to fear the capacity of the judiciary to expand
its authority beyond its original provisions. Federalist leadership in the judiciary pushed
federal conceptions of judicial authority, and this became more evident at the turn of the
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19th century when Jefferson replaced Adams as president and Marbury v. Madison
(1803) came into being (Moskowitz 2017).
The result of Marshall’s unanimous opinion in Marbury was substantial. The
opinion was worded in such a way that Jefferson had no direct option to counteract it.
Jefferson became enraged with the tactics Marshall used. As Melvin Urofsky elaborates,
“Jefferson, of course, realized what the decision meant, and it infuriated him.
Although neither the President nor the Democratic[-]Republican press ever
commented on it publicly—since, after all, Jefferson had ‘won’— privately he
decried the opinion for its ‘sophistry’ and what he called Marshall’s
‘twistifications.’ To Abigail Adams he wrote: ‘The opinion which gives to
judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only
for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature & executive
also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch’” (Urofsky
2006).

Marshall gained victory over his enemy while preserving the security of his branch of
government. The elegance of these “twistifications” Marshall employed made it
impossible for his rivals to counter his decision. The legitimacy of the Court was both
expanded and preserved, with little the executive could do about it. The public saw this as
a win for Jefferson (Urofsky 2006), but truly it was a win for the Court. It showed the
Supreme Court which tactics they could use to render decisions in the future. Scott
Lemieux writes that “the strategic moves identified by scholars in Marbury have
remained relevant even as the Court has gained legitimacy and authority” (Lemieux
2003). Marbury created tools that left an impact well beyond the scope of the Early
National Period.
The obscure provision Marshall overturned in Marbury allowed for the Court to
continue deciding cases with judicial review. Both in Marbury v. Madison (1803) and in
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Stuart v. Laird (1803), a case decided shortly thereafter, the Court weighed the conflict
not by the conflict itself, but by the Federal Judiciary Acts that allowed for the conflict to
occur in the first place. This strategic measure was helpful because “the justices avoided
directly challenging Jefferson or the [newly] Republican Congress” while simultaneously
expanding Federalist ideals of strong government (Gillman, Graber, and Whittington
2017, 103). Regardless of whether acts expanded or limited the judiciary upon passage,
the Court still reserved the right to weigh in on the constitutionality of them.
In later cases, the Supreme Court reasserted its right to rule on matters involving
state governments and the lower judicial branches (Fletcher v. Peck 1810; Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee 1816), and lower courts also asserted their right to exercise judicial
review in their respective jurisdictions (US v. The William 1808). These victories were
possible after the fortified precedent of Marbury v. Madison (1803). The impact of
Marbury extended well beyond the original scope of the case. It defined the entire Early
National Period rather than existing within a single moment in time. Marshall’s
leadership in the Early National Period’s partisan cases guided the Court in a more
Federalist direction, even when these circumstances resulted in a loss for members of the
Federalists.
Marshall also continued expanding the rights of the judiciary indirectly as he
extended the rights of the other branches. In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Marshall
offered a sweeping interpretation of Congressional powers through the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Under Marshall’s framework “necessary” became more about what was
“appropriate” rather than required to meet a certain end (McCulloch v. Maryland 1819).
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McCulloch was not a case that directly challenged the legitimacy of the Supreme Court,
but its effects reflected on the Court’s political bias and authority. Marshall’s attitude in
McCulloch demonstrates the same perspective he took towards the cases defending the
Supreme Court. Segal and Spaeth write that “Marshall voted the way he did because he
was extremely liberal” (Segal and Spaeth 2002). He took nearly every opportunity
possible to increase the national government’s power. Even when Marshall was
expanding the power of other national branches, he was, by extension, expanding the
power of the Court as a national entity.
In the end, in standing up for the increase of judicial power, John Jay and John
Marshall both defended and created authority for the Supreme Court. They recognized
the pre-existing perception that the Court was weak, so they established a cohesive line of
precedent that argued the opposite. They saw the value of constitutional interpretation,
and pushed Federalist perpectives of laws and judicial activism to accomplish their goals
as Chief Justices. This is why we have the ability to discuss Court legitimacy today.
Without the efforts of the Chief Justices in the Early National Period, our Supreme Court
would be much less legitimate as an institution.
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Chapter 3: Divisions, Rights, and Liberties
in the Mid-1800s
The next period of legitimacy challenges is what I call the Civil War Era. This
extensive section of time ran through three smaller eras: the Antebellum buildup to the
Civil War (1830s-early 1860s), the Civil War itself (1861-1865), and the Reconstruction
Period after the Civil War (late 1860s-1880s). Challenges during those times emphasized
divisions between the North and the South over civil rights, the economy, and national
identities. The buildup to the Civil War and reconstruction after the Civil War witnessed a
similar pattern of responses from the justices, whereas the war period itself saw a slightly
different response pattern. Judicial responses during the whole Civil War Era were
strategic. The justices deferred to Southern preferences to keep the South from secession.
Their strategies eventually came at the cost of public support, but they allowed the Court
to keep its legal authority through awful means.

Historical Factors
After the Early National Period, Andrew Jackson’s presidency brought forth a
new set of issues, for both the Supreme Court and the nation at large. Jackson’s 1828
presidency marked an oppositional shift fueled by public support (Crowe 2012; Lasser
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1988). To succeed in his appeals to the public, Andrew Jackson reintroduced the agrarian
movement that Jefferson relied on. As Justin Crowe writes,
“Jacksonian Democrats, for instance, favored Indian removal and opposed the
Bank of the United States. They generally preferred a strict constitutional
reading to a broad one and a narrow sphere of federal government authority to
an expansive one. They envisioned a society where the common man had power
and respect and an America where Northern financiers held no more influence
than Southern or Western farmers and laborers. Unlike John Marshall and the
justices of the Supreme Court, they were not especially concerned with
protecting private property or the sanctity of contracts; unlike the National
Republicans that preceded them and the Whigs that had emerged to oppose
them, they were against sweeping internal improvements and Henry Clay’s
‘American System.’ In many ways, Jacksonian Democrats renewed and updated
the Jeffersonian tradition, shifting it away from the nationalism that had
consumed it since the War of 1812 and back toward the small government,
agricultural roots of the late 1790s and early 1800s” (Crowe 2012, 109).

Yet there was a certain twist to Jacksonian thought that made Jackson’s presidency
distinct from the Early National Period. Conflicts between the individual states
influenced his presidency in a new way. Pre-existing divides between the North and the
South intensified at this time, as the nation was split between states which permitted
slavery and states which did not. Western expansion only brought further dilemmas for
state conflicts. Each state admitted to the union had to be defined as a slave state or
non-slave state (Crowe 2012), and if the balance between the two was disrupted, it could
feed into rebellion or secession (Lasser 1988). As the turbulence of Jackson’s presidency
reached the forefront of politics, the issues surrounding society kept building toward
impending conflict.
Jackson’s presidency may have contributed to tensions defining the Civil War
Period, but it was by no means the only responsible factor. Other factors included the
western expansion mentioned above, tensions over slavery, right-wing populism, and, last
but not least, the end of the Federalist reign on the Supreme Court. As Marshall’s tenure
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on the Supreme Court came to a close in 1835 (Paul 2018), there was a noticeable shift in
the problems facing the Court. For one matter, under Marshall’s tenure, Jackson
questioned whether the Court could follow through with judicial decisions. President
Andrew Jackson supposedly uttered the phrase “Marshall has made his decision, now let
him enforce it” in the aftermath of Worcester v. Georgia (1832), but the exact comment is
uncertain (Breyer 2007; Rosen 2017). Under Marshall’s leadership, the Court stood in
opposition to Jackson’s executive authority. It was a barrier to presidential control.
Jackson’s attitude toward the Court changed slightly after he altered its
composition. The new Chief Justice, Roger Taney, received his appointment from
President Jackson, and started serving on the bench in 1836 (Huebner 2010). As far as
Supreme Court appointments go, Taney did well at representing Andrew Jackson’s
interests on the Court. He was an avid supporter of the former Tennessee governor, and a
“loyal” judge to the President’s interests (Huebner 2010). Jackson placed Taney on the
bench, as he rightfully believed Chief Justice Taney would adhere to Jacksonian
principles while setting precedent. Taney continued to push a Jacksonian perspective into
the Court in the decades he served as the Chief Justice, even after Jackson’s presidency
ended.
Right-wing populism, an external factor in Jackson’s presidency, contributed
further to Jackson’s approach to politics. One of Andrew Jackson’s nicknames was “King
Mob,” due the way he harnessed populist rage in the South (Michael 2015). Jackson’s
campaign drew on the candidate’s military past to evoke patriotic imagery of the common
man and win the “hearts” of people across the nation (Nester 2013). Andrew Jackson’s
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gruff demeanor stood in stark contrast to the image people expected of elites in
government. He used his personal imagery to stoke populist rage in his base. The
President’s base was “an alliance consisting of lower-class whites, Southern planters, and
sections of the Northern elite,” who were angry at the government (Michael 2015).
Jackson was responsible for fueling populist anger that eventually grew into Civil War
conflicts.
As the Civil War approached, the divisions stemming from Jackson’s presidency
had grown increasingly violent. The 1850s marked a contentious period, and as Paul
Finkelman explains, “from 1848 to 1861 America was like a train speeding down the
track, without an engineer or brakes” (Finkelman 2013). The dispute that eventually
broke out seemed inevitable, considering the political discord that plagued the nation
through the “long decade” (Finkelman 2013). Economic concerns and threats from
expansion drove slaveholding states to rebellion, and Northern citizens hated enforcing
Southern slave policies within their own borders (Rockman 2012; Finkelman 2013). As
much as some people in the North and the South wanted to keep separate policies,
economic and human rights concerns could not stay constrained by state borders.
Divisions over slavery, morality, and the economy tore at the nation, intensifying
throughout the 1850s.
In 1861, the building animosity between Northern and Southern states eventually
boiled over as war broke out (Rockman 2012). The federal government’s efforts to
preserve the union in the previous decades were not enough to stop the conflict. This war
was especially brutal for the United States, and arguably “the bloodiest war in American
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history” (Choudhry 2012). Between 1861 and 1865, approximately 50,000 civilians and
620,000 soldiers died, marking more American soldier deaths than several other conflicts
combined (Faust 2008). Northerners and Southerners who made up the armies “grappled
with unfamiliar equipment” and low supplies on the battlefields (Broomall 2019, 35).
Disease and violence spread in soldier encampments, and starvation ran rampant in the
South (Faust 2008). As the conflict stretched on, its effects seeped into the facets of
everyday life for soldiers and civilians alike.
When the Civil War came to a close, and the South surrendered, the different
branches of government prioritized reconstructing the nation. The arduous task of
rebuilding after the sheer damage of the war felt unachievable. How could unity be
possible after the utter destruction of the Civil War? It would be a mistake to say the
divides of the war dissipated with the conflict. The anger did not just disappear. It
morphed, taking on different forms of discrimination and violence (Wong 2015). In the
midst of this anger, all branches of government, but especially the legislative branch,
faced the seemingly insuperable task of reuniting the nation (Foner 2012). Slave-holding
states persisted in their efforts to strip former slaves of their human rights, as they passed
laws limiting the rights of African Americans (Wong 2015). This led to the passage of
Amendments 13, 14, and 15 — each of which provided federal intervention to protect the
civil rights of freed slaves (Foner 2012). These amendments, then, affected the way the
Supreme Court could interpret the Constitution.
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Challenges to Supreme Court Legitimacy
The political issues facing society in the Antebellum phase left a noticeable
impact on the Supreme Court’s docket. In the decades leading up to the 1860s, the
Supreme Court justices balanced their role as decision makers with the challenges they
faced to the “united” nature of the United States. The nation’s split between Northern and
Southern states continued to ebb into the Court’s decision-rendering process. Significant
cases had the potential to push Southern states closer to secession. As Justin Crowe
explains,
“[b]y the time the first shots were fired on Fort Sumter in 1861, the
judiciary—reorganized by Jacksonians, supported by antebellum Democrats,
and dominated by slaveholding interests—was at the center of a firestorm over
slavery and secession, over the rights of citizens and the nature of the Union”
(Crowe 2012, 131).

If justices erred in their judicial opinions, it could cause severe consequences, both for the
nation and for the Supreme Court. As a federal entity, with justices pulled from judicial
circuits across the United States (Crowe 2012, 86-87), the Supreme Court had a vested
interest in maintaining federal authority. Even Southern justices, with allegiances to the
values they held, acted in national roles representing a united federal branch. Losing
unity as a nation would make Southern justices lose their power as members of the
Supreme Court. Jackson and Taney may have argued for less centralized governmental
power, yet their actions within this time period often advocated for an increase in
governmental authority. The era surrounding the Civil War was one that demanded
greater governmental action (Foner 2012).
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In the conflicts plaguing political divides, the Supreme Court became the arbiter
of disputes between Northern and Southern states. The Democrats kept trying to force the
Court to take on the question of slavery, arguing that it was a constitutional question
rather than a matter lawmakers could decide (Crowe 2012, 135). This led to the
development of Groves v. Slaughter (1841), Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), and Dred Scott
v. Sanford (1857), some of the most infamous cases in the history of the Court. Groves
was the first slavery case for the Taney Court (Lasser 1988), Prigg concerned the role
Northern states played in catching slaves (Prigg v. Pennsylvania 1842), and Dred Scott
questioned both whether slaves are citizens of the United States, and whether people are
still considered slaves if they travel into free states (Dred Scott v. Sanford 1857). The
latter two of these cases unfortunately led to harsh outcomes for civil rights. As Justin
Crowe explains of the Dred Scott case,
“[i]ndeed, it was precisely this intersection of the slavery debate and the
pressing need for improvements to existing judicial machinery that structured
debates over institution building in the late 1850s and early 1860s. It was in
those years, after repeated Democratic attempts to delegate the slavery question
to the judiciary effectively produced Dred Scott v. Sanford, that the nascent
Republican Party sought to break the Southern stranglehold on the Supreme
Court” (Crowe 2012, 137).

Dred Scott’s 7-2 decision was the Supreme Court’s answer to the slavery dispute.
Continuing the precedent from Prigg, Dred Scott showed the Supreme Court’s
willingness to issue decisions favoring Southern and slave-holding states (Dred Scott v.
Sanford 1857). The Court denied rights to individuals when faced with a challenge, yet
did so in a way that reasserted its ability to address critical constitutional crises. The
Court negatively used civil rights issues to build normative, institutional legitimacy.
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As the Civil War broke out, the Supreme Court handled multiple quarrels over
powers in government. The Court still had to demonstrate its ability to function as an
impartial entity when the nation was polarized enough to have a Civil War. However, as
Jacksonian thought persisted on the bench, several of the Court’s Civil War decisions
admonished President Lincoln’s expression of emergency powers. Ex parte Merryman
(1861) and the Prize Cases (1863) reflected bitter disputes between Taney and Lincoln
over the extent of federal power. To appease divides across the states, the Court often
favored Southern states. Additionally, it is worth noting that Taney passed away in 1864,
and Lincoln was able to maneuver the Court’s political leanings to a more Republican
perspective by the end of the war (Crowe 2012, 146). There were still a few decisions
which questioned executive authority that the Court handed down shortly after the Civil
War (Ex parte Milligan 1866; Ex parte McCardle 1869). Yet, for the most part, Lincoln
positioned himself well to move Reconstruction Period politics forward in the Supreme
Court after Taney’s death.
The aftermath of the Civil War questioned how the nation should rebuild itself.
Most of the Reconstruction Period’s changes created opportunities for federal powers to
expand. In order to fix damages incurred by the South, the three branches of government
worked to collectively expand national powers. As Eric Foner writes,
“[t]he laws and amendments of Reconstruction opened the door for future
Congresses and the federal courts to define and redefine the guarantee of
equality, a process that has occupied the courts for the better part of the last
half-century” (Foner 2012).

The motivation to expand federal powers can be seen in a couple of Court cases in
particular. The Legal Tender Cases (1871), in overturning Hepburn v. Griswold (1870),
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allowed the federal government to coin money across the United States. More emphasis
appeared on the unity of states rather than individual state policies. The Court continued
to experiment with reconstructive politics until this era drew to an end.
A critical component to judicial reconstruction efforts was how to address the
rights slavery infringed upon. How could the government guarantee rights that should
have been acknowledged in the first place? The appearance of three new amendments
delivered additional protections. The 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments sought to
minimize discrimination that came from Congress and the states. Yet, as the Court would
soon show, these amendments were not enough to protect individuals. They were merely
compromises, in a nation where discrimination appeared on all sides. As Eric Foner
elaborates,
“all the major accomplishments of the Reconstruction era, from the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, were compromises, the work of numerous individuals and factions
within the Republican Party. They reflected ambivalent attitudes, in Congress
and society at large, about the scope of racial equality. They attempted a partial,
not total, modification of the existing federal system” (Foner 2012).

Congress still did not do enough to protect former slaves from discrimination, but at least
it recognized the need to adapt the Constitution in order to advocate for increased rights.
These amendments changed the way the Court had to think about a wide variety of
issues, from incorporation to individual liberties. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
eventually moved away from reconstructive politics after the 1887 end to the
Reconstruction Period, and the Court argued against the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the
Civil Rights Cases (1883) (Foner 2012). The Court’s narrow construction of civil rights
created precedent for this new area of the Constitution.
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To sum up the challenges faced by the Supreme Court in the mid-1800s, these
were issues concerning both rights and unity. The Supreme Court gained helpful tools for
interpreting civil rights. The question was how the justices would choose to use them.
The primary objective of the mid-1800s Supreme Court was to preserve national unity.
However, the pattern of the cases above demonstrates how this goal often conflicted with
preserving rights and liberties in light of slavery. Continued deference for unifying the
country often led to a decrease in rights for African Americans. Only in cases concerning
liberties of white, Southern soldiers did the Court prioritize individual liberties during the
Civil War, as shown with the three Ex Parte cases surrounding Lincoln’s presidency. The
challenges were similar in nature; they each managed the Court’s ability to survive
divisions and partisan warfare. Each of these challenges demanded proper responses from
a judiciary which was not prepared to deliver them.

The Court’s Responses
The responses to the similar challenges can be divided into three parts: pre-Civil
War, Civil War, and post-Civil war. Judicial responses before and after the Civil War
minimized individual rights and gave victory to Southerners. During the Civil War,
judicial responses opposed President Lincoln, yet still advocated for unity by deferring to
the South. Judicial responses during the Civil War Era minimized damages to legitimacy
at first. They allowed the Court to survive past challenges as they happened. However,
the responses eventually left a terrible legacy for the judiciary over time. As society
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recognized the pain left by judicial decisions, it looked down on the methods from the
Civil War Era.
The first clear pattern of judicial responses appears in Prigg and Dred Scott. The
Supreme Court viewed civil rights as a threat to its legitimacy, as they would push the
South to secession. The Court denied rights to people who deserved them, due to its
hopes to unite a discriminatory nation. Both of these cases left a legacy which eventually
hurt the reputation of the Supreme Court (Lasser 1988). Yet, at the time, the Court’s
decisions in these cases aimed to calm tensions between the North and the South.
Whether intentional or unintentional, Taney’s decisions in Prigg and Dred Scott were
“strategic” (Baum 2006) — they referred back to constitutional provisions and applied
specific facets of the law to the facts of the case. Considering that Taney once argued
against slavery before (Huebner 2010), it is even possible that his decisions in Prigg and
Dred Scott went against his own beliefs. These decisions affirmed the Court’s authority to
exercise judicial review while making the Constitution seem more palatable to white
Southerners considering secession. The cases were a loss to Northern states, but not
Northern interests. Taney worked towards national unity by appealing to explicit racism
in the Constitution.
As mentioned above, the legitimacy crisis within Dred Scott came from a few
different areas. First, there was a challenge to the Court’s power to review
constitutionality. The Court’s response in Prigg and Dred Scott affirmed the
Constitution’s words through recognizing the Constitution’s overt and implicit racist
undertones. Second, there was the hidden challenge to the Court’s authority as a national
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entity. The justices of the Supreme Court temporarily preserved their legitimacy by
working towards national unity. Therefore, they allowed for the Court to still exist as a
national body drawn from Northern and Southern circuits. The third challenge was
indirect, and more appeared several decades later, although it was acknowledged by a few
politicians at the time (Lasser 1988). This was the awful legacy left behind by the Dred
Scott case. The impact of this will appear later in Chapter 5’s discussion on
desegregation, but it was an issue the Court’s response caused rather than solved. The
pre-Civil War response of the Court to slavery prioritized legitimacy through unity over
human and civil rights.
Next, as the Civil War took place, the Supreme Court worked towards unity by
arguing against President Lincoln’s actions. This time the justices fought for individual
liberties, specifically the liberties of white soldiers fighting on behalf of the South. The
three Ex parte cases mentioned above dealt with the rights of Southern individuals when
the executive exercised emergency powers. In each of these cases, overreach of executive
authority was turned down. In some ways, the Supreme Court justices seem strategic in
their methods for reducing executive authority. During the war, the Court was briefly able
to switch priorities, in hopes to appeal to Southern states. At the same time, the methods
Taney used may only indicate the spite he held for Lincoln. As mentioned above, bitter
disputes between the two were echoed in Taney’s decisions in Merryman and the Prize
Cases (Crowe 2012). Perhaps the cases from the Civil War itself were meant to preserve
unity, but they may have held a different purpose instead.
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Then, in the Reconstruction Period, the Court gave Southern states more freedoms
at the cost of civil rights. Congress and the states may have ratified the 13th, 14th, and
15th Amendments, but the Supreme Court effectively reduced the impact of the 14th and
15th Amendments through the Civil Rights Cases (1883) and subsequent decisions.
Republican reconstruction efforts prioritized “the development of a national industrial
economy” at the expense of “displacing the party’s prior emphasis on protecting African
Americans in the South” (Crowe 2012, 164). Republican efforts to manipulate the
judiciary succeeded in reframing reconstruction. Unfortunately, it would be a long time
before the Court would permit other entities to preserve civil rights for African
Americans.
Throughout the Civil War Era, the Court extended a few legitimacy-preserving
efforts started in the Early National Period. However, its methods for doing so were more
implicit than direct. For instance, before and after the Civil War, the Supreme Court
expanded federal powers. Prigg v. PA (1842) and the Legal Tender Cases (1871) were
two of the strongest examples of the Court working to expand federal authority. This
expansion, in turn, let the Supreme Court gain more power as a consequence. Granted,
the Supreme Court did also restrict the executive’s powers during the Civil War. Ex parte
Milligan (1866), Ex parte Merryman (1861), Ex parte McCardle (1869), and the Prize
Cases (1863) demonstrate the Court’s willingness to limit executive authority during the
Civil War itself. Yet the Court largely appealed to federal powers in the most crucial
questions to legitimacy brought up through the Civil War. Chief Justice Taney was more
of a Jacksonian and Jeffersonian in his principles as a justice (Huebner 2010), but some
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of the work he did before the Civil War allowed for a more powerful Court and federal
government.

Impact of the Responses
The clearest impact to the Court’s legitimacy in the Civil War Era exists in the
cases directly concerning slavery. Looking back on these cases now, it is apparent how
disappointing they are to our national history. The worst part of these cases is that they
did not misinterpret the intention of the Constitution. The most important document in
American legal history is one which explicitly excluded certain groups of people (Prigg
v. PA 1842; U.S. Const. 1788). The 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments sought to remedy
the Constitution’s direct racial discrimination. Yet because of limitations placed by the
Supreme Court near the end of the Reconstruction Period, these amendments were not as
successful as they seemed on the surface (Foner 2012).
Then there was the question of how the Court directly handled challenges to its
normative legitimacy. Compared to the Early National Period, these challenges were less
frequent, especially once Jacksonian and Southern justices controlled the Supreme Court
in place of Marshall. When Jackson “deftly” found a way to disregard the Supreme Court
in Worcester, he did so by avoiding direct conflict with the Court, and acted by getting
around the decision. This method allowed the Court to avoid responding directly to
Jackson’s challenge, as “[t]he Supreme Court never had to issue an order requiring
compliance and the crisis was defused” without further action (Rosen 2017). Worcester
set a precedent for the Court to avoid direct challenges to its legitimacy. Even as the
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Supreme Court justices changed over time, they could still apply Marshall’s tools for
avoiding challenges brought from the executive. Other challenges to Supreme Court
legitimacy in the mid-1800s were less direct compared to the Early National Period. The
Supreme Court’s pursuit of national unity helped it avoid more devastating normative
challenges to legitimacy, while its responses allowed it to appeal to Southerners in the
public. The Court’s efforts were misguided attempts to balance partisanship.
Now that official tools for incorporation existed within the Constitution, the
Supreme Court gained greater authority over disputes occurring within the states. Before
these three amendments, the Supreme Court had difficulties with extending federal Bill
of Rights limitations to the states (Barron v. Baltimore 1833; Amar 1992). After the
passage of the 14th Amendment in particular, the Supreme Court could “make the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states” (Adamson v. CA 1947; Mykkeltvedt 1971). This meant
that the Court gained the power to extend constitutional authority to more disputes over
state actions. With the ties “legitimacy” holds to “power” and “authority” (Gibson,
Lodge, and Woodson 2014), the Supreme Court’s legitimacy expanded through the 14th
Amendment’s incorporation powers. As the Supreme Court’s power grew, so did the
authority it held through institutional norms, or normative legitimacy. This is how the
Court’s legitimacy continued expanding after the Civil War.
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Chapter 4: Expansion as the Supreme Court
Transitions into the New Deal Era
The previous periods had an explicit link together, but the distinction between
Chapters 3 and 4 spans across several decades. That is not to say that few important cases
faced the Court between the 1880s and 1930s. After the Reconstruction Period, the
Supreme Court encountered difficult cases dealing with critical social themes. These
matters included prohibition, monopolistic corporations, and workers’ rights (US v. EC
Knight 1895; Allgeyer v. Louisiana 1897; Lochner v. NY 1905; Stafford v. Wallace 1922;
Adkins v. Children's Hospital 1923). However, for several decades, few cases together
questioned the Supreme Court’s authority to the extent of previous eras, with the
exception of In re Neagle (1890).4 Despite Neagle’s acknowledgement of the Court’s
powers, most of the cases between the 1880s and early 1900s concerned specific societal
matters, rather than effects on Supreme Court legitimacy. This is the reason for the large
shift in time between Chapters 3 and 4.
The transition into the New Deal Era brought about a shift in challenges to
Supreme Court legitimacy. Larger questions about the role of the judiciary, the
applicability of legal frameworks, and the most acceptable way to respond to the Great
Depression loomed behind unassuming cases on the Supreme Court’s docket (Crowe

4

In Neagle, the majority opinion stated that, of the three branches, “the judicial is the weakest for the
purposes of self-protection and for the enforcement of the powers which it exercises” (In re Neagle 1890).
Neagle served as an example of the Court strategically playing into weaknesses usually brought up by the
other branches.
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2012; Schiller 2007). The justices often found themselves in contention with President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Court faced a period of time where it was diametrically
opposed to public opinion (Ho and Quinn 2010; Friedman 2009). This is why I am
choosing to prioritize the transition into the New Deal Era, despite a few critical cases,
like Neagle, on the docket between the 1880s and the 1930s. The descriptive challenges
of public support for Roosevelt’s presidency grew into a series of normative challenges
for the legal capacity of the Supreme Court.

Historical Factors
For a long period of time, otherwise known as “the Lochner Era,” the Court
maintained a pro-business, pro-contract attitude. The Lochner Era, epitomized through a
single case, Lochner v. New York (1905), was a departure from state police powers and
national regulation in favor of individual rights. David Strauss, in demonstration of the
contemporary hatred toward the epoch-defining case, writes,
“Lochner, which declared unconstitutional a New York maximum hours statute
for bakers, is, of course, more than just a case. It symbolizes the era in which the
Supreme Court invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare and regulatory
measures, including minimum wage laws, laws designed to enable employees to
unionize, and a federal statute establishing a pension system for railway
workers” (Strauss 2003).

Before the New Deal Era, the Lochner Era created a series of precedent for protecting
businesses from government regulation. The historical context here comes from industrial
expansion and governmental confusion over how to deal with it. A constitutional
dilemma arose over the extent to which industrialization recrafted businesses (Siegel
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1991). Several state governments worked to protect the health of workers in dangerous
environments (Allgeyer v. Louisiana 1897; Lochner v. New York 1905; Muller v. Oregon
1908; Siegel 1991). However, most of these cases were struck down by the Court in favor
of individual freedom of contract (Strauss 2003). The Lochner Era fed into a new,
impending era — one which demanded greater governmental influence over both labor
and the economy.
In the midst of the Lochner Era, the Great Depression struck the United States. In
October 1929 came the “complete collapse of the stock market” (Hardman 1999). The
Great Depression caused mass unemployment across the United States, with nearly a
quarter of the labor force out of their jobs (Hillman 2008). As John Hardman explains,
conditions in the United States looked dire by 1932.
“By 1932 United States industrial output had been cut in half. One fourth of the
labor force -- about 15 million people -- was out of work, and there was no such
thing as unemployment insurance. Hourly wages had dropped by about 50
percent. Hundreds of banks had failed. Prices for agricultural products dropped
to their lowest level since the Civil War. There were more than 90,000
businesses that failed completely.
Statistics, however, can only partially give an account of the extraordinary
hardships that millions of United States citizens endured. For nearly every
unemployed person, there were dependents who needed to be fed and housed.
Such massive poverty and hunger had never been known in the United States
before” (Hardman 1999).

Franklin D. Roosevelt offered a solution to the Great Depression in his 1932 presidential
campaign. Roosevelt sought to reform conditions in the United States by reforming the
government itself (Schiller 2007). Roosevelt introduced economic policies with haste
after winning the 1932 election in a landslide (Schiller 2007; Hardman 1999). He created
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New Deal legislation to prompt economic and political changes so that the government
would be able to tackle its recent sociopolitical crisis (Hillman 2008).
The Supreme Court’s composition, however, served as a setback for Roosevelt. At
the beginning of Roosevelt’s presidency, the Court was composed of a near even split for
justices. There were the conservative Four “Horsemen,” Butler, Van Devanter,
McReynolds, and Sutherland; the liberal Three “Musketeers,” Brandeis, Cardozo, and
Stone; and the two swing justices, Hughes and Roberts (Ho and Quinn 2010; Crowe
2012). The conservative members of the Court often dominated judicial politics, in what
Justin Crowe terms a “titanic clash” between the Supreme Court and President Roosevelt
(Crowe 2012, 225). Keith Whittington calls Roosevelt an “oppositional president” for the
way he contrasted with other parts of government (Whittington 2007). Yet, truly, it was
not Roosevelt who stood in opposition to everyone else in the mid-1930s. The
conservative-driven Supreme Court existed in the midst of progressive politics elsewhere
(Schiller 2007). A judiciary which continued to push Lochner Era precedent stood in the
way of Roosevelt’s expansive New Deal policies.
Through the New Deal, Roosevelt announced a series of policies concerning
“monopolies, child labor, taxation, production, and manufacturing” (Crowe 2012). These
topics were recognizable themes in the Lochner Era as well, but now there was more of a
public push to see them accomplished (Friedman 2009). When the Court repeatedly shot
those measures down, Roosevelt proposed a plan that would allow him to appoint and
replace enough justices who would concur with him ideologically (Siegel 1991, Footnote
3; Badas 2019). As the justices faced the impending threat of Roosevelt’s Court-packing
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plan, and fear of public opinion towards it, they experienced ideological changes. Two
justices in particular are often credited with moving the ideological spectrum of the
Supreme Court enough to stall Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan. They are Chief Justice
Hughes and Associate Justice Roberts (Ho and Quinn 2010). Roosevelt’s plan eventually
became unnecessary, for reasons listed later in this section, but it served as a critical
historical factor in the Court’s transition from utilizing Lochner Era thought into
accepting FDR’s New Deal plans.
The effect of mass media heightened the importance of descriptive legitimacy
during this time. Although inherently impossible to discern with complete accuracy,
public opinion became comparatively easier to measure by the 1930s. Roosevelt’s
election proved the effectiveness of George Gallup’s public opinion poll measurements.
Previous polling data relied on measures such as car registration data and phone books,
relying on quantity of respondents rather than quality (Ho and Quinn 2010). Gallup’s
polling methods, based on smaller polling percentages, correctly predicted a win for FDR
when other methods did not (Ho and Quinn 2010; Caldeira 1987). Through applying
Gallup’s polling strategies, political results became easier to predict, and political
scientists found more reliable ways to measure public opinion than biased polls (Caldeira
1987). FDR’s election, and the data associated with it, made descriptive legitimacy more
measurable than before.
By the New Deal Era, telecommunications and information accessibility had
changed drastically. In the legitimacy challenges facing the Supreme Court during the
Civil War Era, information access was limited to what people could read or see in person.
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In the late 1890s, Guglielmo Marconi launched a wireless telegraphy system known as
radio broadcasting (Bruton 2006). By 1927, Congress placed limits on radio
broadcasting, given its influence in society. They clarified the radio was a tool for “public
interest, convenience, or necessity,” and that broadcasters seem to enter a social contract
with the public to broadcast (Snider, Barranca, and Debroy 2004). The radio came into
being to convey information to the public. With public opinion serving such a key role in
the meaning of “legitimacy,” telecommunicated mass media was an unprecedented
transformation. It expanded information access so politicians could harness viewers
across the nation with haste. No longer was information restricted by proximity. The
communication transformation took national cohesion to a new frontier. Some argue that
the expansion efforts of New Deal policy might not have been possible without the
extensive reach of media (Caldeira 1987). Regarding the media, though, one thing is
certain: it played a transformative role in FDR’s ability to reach out to the public, and in
the public’s capacity to evaluate the Court.

Challenges to Supreme Court Legitimacy
Challenges arose during the New Deal Transition Period because of the Lochner
Era’s precedent. The Court remained stuck in its Lochner mindset when the rest of
society had moved on. This truly marked a transition period, when not everyone shifted at
the same time. The greatest challenge facing the Supreme Court was how to balance
public opinion with recent precedent. The Supreme Court is an institution based in
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adhering to legal standards, including ones set through precedent (Fowler and Jeon 2008).
For the Court to follow public opinion trends, as well as pressure from Roosevelt, it
would have to reverse decades of previous decisions in the process.
As the Great Depression started to affect society, the initial threat to the Court was
minimal compared to the threat to come. The individual justices started to take notice of
the severe issues impacting society, but these issues were less of a direct threat to the
Supreme Court’s legitimacy at first. The challenge built up slowly, and through a variety
of new cases that kept piling on. As Justin Crowe explains,
“from World War I to World War II, through normalcy and the New Deal, the
federal judiciary not only faced a caseload vastly greater than its capacity but
also a diverse set of political actors that seemed decidedly hostile to its work”
(Crowe 2012).

The challenges affecting society slowly built up over time, eventually overloading the
Court with a series of cases on familiar topics. As the Supreme Court often relies on its
former decisions (Fowler and Jeon 2008), it was able to continue deciding cases in the
same manner for a few years, despite the national turmoil stemming from the Great
Depression.
With President Roosevelt in office, some of the largest issues facing the Court
became metaphorical landmines. The Lochner Era is distinguishable through its
deference to corporate freedoms. As Stephen Siegel writes, in the “deviant period, known
as the Lochner era, the Court underconstrued the scope of [C]ongressional power and
overprotected private property” (Siegel 1991, 3). The types of cases which defined the
Lochner era, those of businesses, private property, and contracts, kept appearing well into
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the first years of Roosevelt’s presidency. The difference, though, is that now these cases
were risky endeavors for the Court, considering the shift in public opinion and the rise of
Roosevelt’s presidency (Caldeira 1987). A few examples of this include A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Co. v. US (1935), West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), and NLRB v. Jones and
Laughlin Steel Company (1937). Each of these cases shows an instance where the
Supreme Court grappled with extending precedent or rewriting it. In Schechter, the Court
emphasized precedent, whereas the justices started to shift by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
(1937) and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Company (1937). Between 1932 and 1937,
the Court witnessed how much opinion had changed from their previous decisions, both
in the public and the other branches (Friedman 2009; Ho and Quinn 2010). The external
shift, then, took time to influence judicial opinions.
The tension between the judiciary and Roosevelt became especially apparent in
the case of A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. US (1935). Schechter is considered the
Lochner Era Court’s most heated dispute in the transition into the New Deal Era. For
many of the justices, Schechter was not only a case over labor practices, it was a case
regarding the abilities of the Court amidst a power-hungry executive branch. In a
unanimous decision, Chief Justice Hughes penned a scathing retort of the National
Industrial Recovery Act’s (NIRA) delegation of powers. He stated that the “sweeping
delegation of legislative power f[ound] no support in the decisions” the government
typically relies on (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. US 1935). The justices disagreed with
the vast discretion offered to Roosevelt in the NIRA, which fell outside the scope of
constitutional powers (Bressman 2000).
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1937 was the year that the Supreme Court’s attitude began to change. As
mentioned above, Chief Justice Hughes and Associate Justice Roberts stopped siding
with the ideological Four Horsemen in 1937. There is some debate over the specific case
where this turning point happened, whether it was West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) or
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Company (1937), but the case is clear that 1937
marked a major shift (Caldeira 1987; Ho and Quinn 2010). The Court began permitting
Roosevelt’s almost “imperialist” presidency (Whittington 2007, 168), and the justices let
Roosevelt’s New Deal policies bring about necessary changes. Judicial leniency allowed
society to recover from the economic hardships of the Great Depression. The Court
responded to Roosevelt’s relentless New Deal reforms when they eventually realized the
opposition and necessities they faced. From the Court-packing plan and public support
for New Deal reforms, a “tacit deal” was formed between the Supreme Court and the
American public, where the Court could keep its structure as long as its interpretations
did not stray too far from the will of the people (Friedman 2009).
As mentioned above, the Court initially kept doing everything in its power to
prevent Roosevelt from getting his way. The justices, especially the Four Horsemen, saw
Roosevelt’s expansive measures as a violation of limited federal powers in the
Constitution, and several scholars agree with that interpretation today (Epstein 2006;
Crowe 2012; Whittington 2007). Roosevelt’s progressive policies largely intended to
increase federal control. At the same time, he hoped to limit the influence of the
conservative justices who had controlled the Court for a long period of time (Crowe
2012). The judiciary faced a severe challenge from the other branches of government in
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the New Deal Transition Period. Roosevelt’s challenge affected the judiciary’s capacity to
interpret the law by altering the composition of the judiciary itself. As Alex Badas
explains,
“[m]embers of the Court also viewed the Court-packing plan as a threat to its
institutional legitimacy. In an exceptional act, Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes submitted a letter of testimony to the Senate against Roosevelt’s plan. In
the letter, Hughes dispelled Roosevelt’s idea that the plan would increase the
Court’s efficiency and warned that the plan would in fact harm the Court”
(Badas 2019).

This shows that the Court was indeed aware of the potential setback it faced as it
decided cases after the Court-packing plan was introduced. The Court was forced
to grapple with its public image as a result of the Court-packing plan.
Another challenge towards the justices came from a shift within the
composition of the nine justices on the bench. Roosevelt had the chance to replace
one of his most formidable dissenters during a key moment for the Court. In
1937, Justice Hugo Black, an avid endorser of FDR, replaced Justice Willis Van
Devanter, one of the conservative Four Horsemen (Crowe 2012; McGovney
1937). Concerns over Hugo Black’s capacity to execute the law arose, due to his
social and economic philosophy (McGovney 1937). At a time of transition, when
Roosevelt advocated for vast changes, this change had the ability to alter judicial
cases going forward. Whoever sits on the bench has a voice in the decisions it
renders. Roosevelt’s capacity to change the Court’s composition posed a severe
normative threat to the conservative judiciary.
As the Court continued with its 1937 New Deal perspective, federal powers began
expanding, arguably past constitutional limits. As Keith Whittington states, “[t]here is
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little disagreement that American constitutional law was radically remade in the 1930s”
(Whittington 2015). For the federal government to help people overcome the effects of
the Great Depression, it had to create a version of the federal branches which could fully
address that issue. As a result of deference to the states, the Constitution limited the
federal government’s capacity to react to national crises (U.S. Const. 1788; Millhiser
2020). The New Deal Court’s docket still contained the same labor cases which pervaded
the Lochner Era, but it also included a series of cases framed around national powers,
such as U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (1936) and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel
Company (1937). The Supreme Court justices eventually permitted the extension of the
New Deal administrative state, arguably past constitutional allowances, during this time
period.

The Court’s Responses
The first response of the Supreme Court was consistency. The justices rendered
markedly similar decisions to those of the Lochner Era. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan
(1935), Schechter Poultry Co. v. US (1935), US v. Butler (1936), and Carter v. Carter
Coal (1936) demonstrate the same type of limited governmental influence that appears in
the pre-Roosevelt Lochner Era. While the rest of society was moving away from Lochner
Era thought, the Court still embraced it. A partial influence on the Court is the justices’
duty to adhere to precedent. As Fowler and Jeon write, “the justices of the Supreme Court
are aware of the inherent weakness of the federal judiciary and place high value on
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maintaining their institutional and decisional legitimacy through the use of precedent”
(Fowler and Jeon 2008). For Supreme Court justices, applying precedent is often thought
of as the key to maintaining legitimacy. In the New Deal Transition Period, the justices
faced a time where the opposite was true. Judicial norms created a conflict where either
the Supreme Court would have to overrule decades worth of legal precedent, or they
would need to deny the will of the people. Over time, the justices chose the former rather
than the latter (Friedman 2009). The justices saved themselves from a crisis of descriptive
legitimacy through their actions over time.
In a few specific instances, the Court’s opinion provided a scathing defense of
legal standards. In Schechter, the Supreme Court stood up to the external factors of
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, such as the NIRA. To say that the decision in
Schechter was not political is to ignore the fierceness with which the justices direct at the
executive. Chief Justice Hughes termed the NIRA’s presidential deference as “unfettered”
and “without precedent” (Schechter Poultry Co. v. US 1935). He could not believe the
audacity of the discretion offered to someone so willing to rewrite the Constitution and
previous judicial decisions. The difference between legal formalism and legal realism
permeated New Deal discourse (Olken 2014). The Court had much to lose by overruling
its precedent, thus it kept to precedent for a few more years. Questions of what the
government was legally allowed to do in the face of national crisis forced the Court to
decide between helping the people and sticking to the law.
Perhaps one reason for the Court’s consistency has to do with the tenure of
justices outlasting that of the other branches. With the lifetime appointment of justices,
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the Court inherently holds a longer extension of former opinions, which the president can
use to his or her advantage (Moraski and Shipan 1999). It is possible that the transition
into the New Deal Era was so rife with tension because the justices continued to force
Lochner Era opinions into the beginning of the New Deal Era. As with Hugo Black and
Franklin D. Roosevelt, presidents often appoint justices to extend their reach into another
sphere of government (McGovney 1937; Moraski and Shipan 1999). This is the reason
why FDR desperately wanted to replace so many of the justices serving on the bench
when he took over the presidency. His Court-packing plan presumed that justices remain
faithful to the person who appointed them. However, as is evident with Hughes and
Roberts (Ho and Quinn 2010), not every justice is unwavering in their political views.
They can change over time, especially when society warrants that they do so.
The second response of the Court was to switch sides, and thus recognize the
arguments of progressive politicians. Often regarded as the “switch in time that saved
nine,” the swing justices’ decision to side with the liberal justices allowed them to defuse
opinions towards judicial politics between the 1920s and 1930s (Crowe 2012). Here is
where it is key to restate that the Supreme Court’s decisions were controversial. The
consistency of the bench stood in stark contrast to public opinion and the other branches
of government (Friedman 2009). The Court’s oppositional role in politics created a
challenge to its descriptive legitimacy, and one which necessitated a proper response. So
long as the public stood against the Court, the Court remained in danger of draining its
diffuse support. That response came through the media igniting public debates and the
Court deciding to let certain pieces of New Deal legislation pass judicial scrutiny.
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There is an important question that lingers amidst this analysis. Did the Supreme
Court specifically stray from precedent because of public opinion? Or was there another
reason behind this change? Without direct quotes from the two swing justices explicitly
stating their intentions, one cannot guarantee their choice was strategic. The literature
seems to more imply that yes, the switch was a strategic choice, as the Court saw the
public’s reaction to its unpopular decisions and knew it had to change (Ho and Quinn
2010; Crowe 2012; Friedman 2009; Badas 2019). However, it is possible that the change
in decisions was less strategic and more coincidental. Here it is critical to note how few
justices altered their previous stances. A mere two justices dictated the direction of the
entire Court away from its former stances, and Roberts is credited with the greater shift of
the two (Ho and Quinn 2010). When discussing the Supreme Court, it is, after all, a body
composed of a handful of justices. The few impact the many in the legal world.

Impact of the Responses
The impact of the first set of responses is that the Court was able to stick to legal
precedent, as it was arguably obligated to through its constitutional role. The Four
Horsemen, aided by swing justices Roberts and Hughes (Ho and Quinn 2010), kept the
Court in line with old Lochner Era precedent. This fulfilled the typical role of the Court,
as the arbiter of existing laws and precedent. Usually maintaining precedent is a strong
part of preserving judicial legitimacy, so it is understandable why the justices attempted
this method at first (Fowler and Jeon 2008). After the Great Depression, the justices still
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thought that it was better to maintain the pro-business attitudes from the past few
decades.
However, the first type of response caused a negative impact. It fueled the
resentment which was building towards the Court among the public. With progressives
gaining control of the legislature and presidency, the Court came across as a remnant of a
different era. People voted in progressive candidates, issuing clear demands for change.
Justin Crowe states that “the interwar and New Deal judiciary faced an unprecedented
level of hostility from citizens, interest groups, and other branches of government”
(Crowe 2012). Critical issues were impacting society, issues where the Court was hesitant
to budge from existing standards. Desperate times demanded desperate measures, yet it
took a while for the Court to catch up with the rest of society. The New Deal Era’s
responses demonstrate the gradual lag the Court experiences behind public opinion when
change is imminent but the Court stays the same.
When the justices moved to fall in line with public opinion, they challenged the
very definition of the Court’s role. Was the Court truly restricted to its constitutional
duties, or could it extend its abilities even further? The Supreme Court chose to make the
necessary revision of its judicial powers, and it granted itself the ability to counter
precedent in favor of social benefit. It was an “evolutionary” approach to legal theory
(Olken 2014). As Samuel Olken writes,
“this transformation in part was shaped by the persistent influence of legal
classicism, as the Justices grappled with the parameters of local economic
regulation during a period that challenged their assumptions about the role of
judicial review and the nature of constitutional limitations. Consideration of the
interplay between legal classicism and the emergence of New Deal
constitutional adaptivity on the Supreme Court underscores the evolutionary
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nature of this jurisprudential shift and its essentially internal characteristics”
(Olken 2014).

The New Deal Court expanded judicial capacity in shifting away from legal classicism
and formalism. The judiciary enhanced its abilities, reinforced its legitimacy, and
extended federal power all in choosing to allow FDR’s New Deal legislation to pass the
Court’s tests of legality. As the New Deal Court demonstrates, necessity and realism are
key factors in making judicial decisions.
If the Court is to adhere to public opinion, if this remains one of the goals and
lessons construed by the New Deal Era, as Barry Friedman suggests (Friedman 2009),
what does this mean for the body’s institutional legitimacy? The onslaught of attacks the
Court faced from the public showcases the potential detriment of descriptive attacks on
legitimacy. Because these attacks not only dissented with judicial opinions, but they
concerned saving the condition of the United States, they elevated questions over the
Court’s normative authority. The standards guiding judicial discretion were not
exhaustive enough to cover what the Court needed to do to maintain its structural body
(Olken 2014). The Court was forced to ignore some judicial norms in order to save more
important ones. Only after catering to the wishes of the public did the Supreme Court find
itself able to avoid a normative threat to its composition.
The Supreme Court’s judicial discretion in the face of the New Deal Era’s
descriptive and normative challenges serves as a powerful example for judicial authority
in the future. It showcases the potential impact of public opinion, and why it is so
necessary for the Court to engage with the public to preserve its judicial integrity.
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Normative and descriptive legitimacy are more thoroughly linked than one might expect.
Public opinion is dangerous, as it may influence other branches to create normative
challenges to judicial legitimacy, such as the Court-packing plan. The Court maneuvered
through threats to its descriptive legitimacy, which in turn let it preserve its normative
legitimacy. This is how the New Deal Transition Period represents the importance of
judicial responses in the face of crises.
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Chapter 5: The Legacy of Brown v. Board
and the Desegregation cases
The Supreme Court’s resolute stance in Brown v. Board (1954) and its subsequent
cases initiated a period of contention between the different branches. This period lasted
for approximately a decade, and outlined an alternative perspective on Supreme Court
legitimacy. During the earlier transition into the New Deal Era, the Supreme Court
opposed those who enacted necessary changes to better the nation. However, in the
mid-1950s, it was the Court who pushed the country forward while the rest of the
government initially opposed changes. In the Brown epoch, members of the Supreme
Court brought about change at the cost of specific support. In this chapter, I argue that the
actions of Brown’s doctrine increased diffuse support over time, allowing for the
Supreme Court to acquire greater legitimacy.
I acknowledge that other challenges for judicial legitimacy took place between the
New Deal transition period and the mid-1950s (Korematsu v. US 1944; Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer 1952). Nonetheless, the oppositional politics of the mid-1950s
better captured the sentiment with which the Supreme Court addresses critical matters.
When the Court risks public support in the name of what it deems right, it threatens its
institutional capacity to render decisions. Brown v. Board (1954) and the precedent it
created labeled the Supreme Court’s authority as the authority of the law. It increased the
Court’s normative legitimacy until the Court’s descriptive legitimacy followed in suit.
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Furthermore, this era reasserted the role that unity on the bench can play during times of
judicial dissent. There are several key reasons why this period left a vast impact on the
legitimacy of the Supreme Court.

Historical Factors
Before Brown v. Board (1954), the United States was exiting a post-war mindset.
Under Roosevelt’s leadership, World War II centralized power in the federal government.
The Supreme Court handled cases about wartime powers, and between 1941 and 1946,
the Court took on nineteen cases from the wartime office of a single regulatory agency
(Comiskey 1994). The Court needed to discern what powers existed in the midst of the
war, and what efforts would be necessary to build society after the war finished. When
World War II ended, the United States found itself in a new position as a “critical world
power” (Crowe 2012). The United States had more responsibilities in the sphere of
international law, but it also had more responsibilities on the homefront. The judiciary
played a crucial role in the national institution-building of Truman’s presidency, and it
supervised regulatory efforts which improved society at large (Crowe 2012). As inquiries
over social institutions grew, so did concerns over civil rights and liberties. Who would
get to benefit from social improvements in a society filled with inequities? The Court
soon found itself facing a familiar social issue within its own borders, one which the
Court was arguably responsible for over time.
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The history of Brown v. Board (1954) is not merely a history of desegregation. As
the justices acknowledged in their perspective of the case, it is a history affected by
“legalized racial inequality[,] . . . slavery[,] and Jim Crow segregation” (Ogletree 2004).
The utter denial of both human and civil rights for African Americans is intertwined with
United States history. Our government is responsible for a myriad of atrocities based on
racial discrimination. All of these racial biases constructed over time developed to
become the issue of racial integration facing the Supreme Court in the 1950s. The
Supreme Court has played a significant role in the legal construction of discrimination
over time (Prigg v. PA 1842; Dred Scott v. Sanford 1857; Civil Rights Cases 1883; Plessy
v. Ferguson 1896). In fact, the standard for separate but equal was a creation of the Court
itself (Plessy v. Ferguson 1896). Legal precedent developed by the Supreme Court
allowed for segregation to persist well after slavery. In a way, the case of Brown v. Board
(1954) offered the Court a chance for redemption.
By the mid-1950s, these inequalities were exacerbated throughout many aspects
of society. It was clear that Plessy’s idea of “separate but equal” was just another excuse
to avoid true equity and reparations. Edlie Wong explains that through “upholding the
constitutionality of de jure racial segregation, Plessy affirmed whiteness as the condition
of full citizenship” (Wong 2015, 3). Jim Crow laws exacerbated the effects of Plessy for
many decades, perpetuating blatant inequalities well after slavery was no longer legal
(Klarman 2004). Segregated schools were built on inequalities from slavery, such as
teacher preparation and family employment. Less effort was put into training African
American teachers, and families relied on children to help with employment as a result of
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the low wages from slavery (Fairclough and Tasker 2007). Children suffered from de
facto discrimination through Jim Crow laws. Segregated schools served as another excuse
to provide children with an unequal education system based on race.
The direction for Brown v. Board (1954) became apparent after three cases
appeared on the Court’s 1950 docket. The trio of cases, otherwise known as the “1950
Trilogy” implied a shift in the Court’s opinion towards desegregation (Hutchinson 1980;
Sweatt v. Painter 1950; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents 1950; Henderson v. United
States 1950). While the Supreme Court began to insinuate a change from “separate but
equal” doctrine, other branches became more closed off to desegregating schools. As
Herbert Brownell writes, “[d]uring the New Deal years, civil rights legislation had been
blocked thirteen times by Senate filibusters” (Brownell 1995). Congressional reluctance
continued well into the 1950s. Furthermore, after Truman’s presidency subsided, the
public elected the Republican Eisenhower for president, who was not an explicit
supporter of desegregation like his predecessor Harry Truman (Brownell 1995; Layton
2007). The earlier judicial inclinations from the beginning of the 1950s pushed the
Supreme Court towards desegregation, although other branches continued to hold the
Supreme Court back.
Brown confronted the separate but equal doctrine as it pertained to the school
systems. Brown v. Board (1954) compiled a few different cases from a variety of states
(Rosenberg 2008). This made it stand out as a case with national applicability to
segregation in the education system. Students faced discrepancies in their education as a
result of separate but supposedly “equal” policies. African American students lacked
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access to resources, opportunities, and rights under the segregated education system of
the 1950s. “[T]he condition of most rural schools was about the same in 1940 as it had
been in 1870” for African American schools, and only a few elite private schools saw any
improvements at all (Fairclough and Tasker 2007). The treatment that students faced
solely because of race did not disappear under segregation. Rather, it worsened; feeding
into further inequalities and perpetuating the effects of slavery. Brown v. Board (1954)
addressed these matters through a variety of locations and disputes. This case, which took
two years for the Supreme Court to decide (Rosenberg 2008), served as the perfect
platform to counter the inequalities of public education.
To move from the subject matter of Brown v. Board (1954) to the government
approaching the case, the political dynamic of the early 1950s was largely against
desegregation. The Supreme Court was the first branch of the federal government to
follow through with such a strong stance against segregation during the 1950s, whereas
the rest of the political body leaned in opposition (Brownell 1995). State governments,
however, had a variety of rules. As Rosenberg writes in The Hollow Hope, “twenty-seven
states either prohibited segregated schools outright or had no laws dealing with the
question while twenty-one either required or allowed segregated schools” (Rosenberg
2008, 42). President Eisenhower at the very least thought that the mission of Brown
would not come to fruition (Brandenburg 2004), at most he dissented with the position
Brown eventually took towards desegregation (Cho 1998). Opposition came from all
sides for the Court.
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There was political and institutional resistance to segregation prior to Brown, but
it did not gain further traction until the Court case took place. President Truman is noted
to have fought for greater institutional protections for African Americans, but he did so at
least in part to gain descriptive legitimacy across the world during the Cold War (Layton
2007, 244). Sending a message of tolerance reflected well on his authority, yet his actions
did not necessarily represent a true interest in desegregation. Furthermore, several
nonprofits and activist groups continued to fight for increased civil rights, such as the
ACLU and NAACP (Zackin 2008; Tushnet 1999; Meier and Bracey 1993). When
nonprofits saw their limited success in the other branches, they eventually turned their
work to the judiciary to institute changes (Zackin 2008). The judiciary became the
necessary actor for desegregation.
When Brown v. Board (1954) was a pending case on the Supreme Court’s docket,
an unexpected event occurred. Chief Justice Vinson passed away suddenly from a heart
attack in 1953, and President Eisenhower was left with the difficult task of finding a new
person to lead the Court (Larson 2011). Vinson did foreshadow the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown through his majority opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), but it is
debatable if he would have rendered the same powerful outcome in Brown as his
successor (Lefberg 1975; Larson 2011). Eisenhower’s choice of Earl Warren for Chief
Justice was not intended to be what it became. Eisenhower thought that the California
Republican who defended Korematsu’s decision would make for a predictable Court for
the impending Brown case (Ogletree 2004). Yet Warren was a much more progressive
choice than he appeared, and he desired a clear, inadmissible decision to integrate the

83

schools in Brown (Crowe 2012; Ogletree 2004). Eisenhower came to regret his choice to
place Warren at the top of the highest Court of the land, as Warren’s decision in Brown v.
Board (1954) would instigate an unprecedented turn of events (Cho 1998). This is
another circumstance where, like the New Deal Era, the switch of a justice altered the
judicial landscape of the nation.
The aftermath of the Court’s adamant verdict for integration was mass protest.
State governments refused to comply with federal guidelines set through the Court and
the other branches, and riots broke out throughout schools that first integrated students.
Brown v. Board II (1955) appeared on the Court’s docket when problems arose with the
implementation of Brown’s verdict (Ogletree 2004). Among protests from other
localities, Arkansas passed a state constitutional amendment refusing to implement
Brown (Bhagwat 2008). Arkansas’s protests led to the Little Rock case known as Cooper
v. Aaron (1958), exemplifying the difficulties the Court faced with enforcing judicial
decisions. There was even a national push to impeach Earl Warren in the aftermath of
Brown. Tackett writes, “billboards . . . dotted the South in the 1960s with the common
message: Impeach Earl Warren” (Tackett 2006). The Court faced a dangerous landscape
for descriptive legitimacy through racist protests across the nation.
The inequality of this country did not disappear as the Civil War ended, nor did it
vanish after Brown v. Board (1954). The decision in Brown clarified that separate but
equal was by no means actually equal, but the decision required further enforcement for it
to take effect (Brown v. Board 1954; Clawson and Waltenburg 2009). As Clawson and
Waltenburg write, Brown’s pages were merely “the seeds for the elimination of
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state-created and [state]-sanctioned second-class citizenship for black Americans”
(Clawson and Waltenburg 2009, 2). It took a long time for others within society and the
government to acknowledge the authority of the case. Furthermore, much of the work
Brown sought to achieve was dialed back after subsequent rulings, especially through the
concept of “all deliberate speed” (Chen 2006). Numerous inequalities are still apparent
within our society due to the modifications made on this case over time. The seeds of
segregation continue to limit student opportunities to this day.

Challenges to Supreme Court Legitimacy
The most significant challenge facing the Supreme Court was that of deciding the
desegregation cases in a way that would force others to listen. Dennis J. Hutchinson
writes, “[g]reat cases strain not only the law but also the position and effectiveness of the
Supreme Court” (Hutchinson 1980). The power behind Brown and its successors drew
many questions over the Supreme Court’s authority. As discussed above, the Court
suffered from a series of affronts from lower courts, other branches, and society at large,
especially in the Southern states. While there was a wide variety of attacks for the
Supreme Court to overcome, most of them connected back to the authority of the Court
when rendering divisive decisions. Even by inadvertently questioning the decision of
Brown, governmental officials made an implicit threat to the Court’s legitimacy. In a time
of oppositional politics, the judiciary must exercise additional caution in its conduct.
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The primary goal of the Warren Court was to make desegregation happen. In
order to accomplish their central purpose, the justices had to create a message of unity.
Warren understood the importance of creating an outcome that would stick in Brown v.
Board (1954). A unanimous case would send the message that the Court’s interpretation
of the law was legally unquestionable, and that the opinion had not drifted from the
implicit messages of the 1950s Trilogy (Hutchinson 1980). If not one justice wavered
from the opinion of the rest, then opposition could not challenge the majority opinion
through the voice of a justice’s dissent. It was clear to see that people in the South would
fight back against the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown (Chen 2006). The best way to
avoid additional criticism would be to give them fewer tools to apply from the justices
themselves. If the nine highest judges all adamantly agreed that segregation in schools
was wrong, then there would be fewer ways to apply judicial opinions to segregation.
Next came the challenge of controlling the public’s response. Anger towards the
Court flourished among white people in the South. They could not understand the
Supreme Court’s sudden shift in policy, and outrage toward the judiciary grew. State
governments refused to enforce what they saw as a decision which circumvented the law.
Additionally, they placed blame on the Supreme Court for daring to render such a
decision. A Brennan Center guide by Bert Brandenburg lists several quotes from
members of government in the South. These “attacks” include a quote from a Georgian
State Attorney General, who said, “[t]he State of Georgia is no longer concerned as to
whatever methods of enforcement the Supreme Court employs,” as its government would
refuse to follow them anyways (Brandenburg 2004). If the Supreme Court’s words
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constituted the correct interpretation of the law, then what message would circumventing
its decisions send? Southern states disputed the authority of the Court itself through
disputing the justices’ capacity to render decisions like Brown. In this regard, the specific
attack formed by Brown was impossible to articulate without drawing a connection to the
Court’s larger reservoir of support. Every instance of pushback from society prompted
additional urgency from the justices.
As a part of influencing the public, the Supreme Court needed to rely on the other
branches of the federal government. This meant the Court had to convince them of the
power of the judiciary through diffuse support, which continued to dwindle. As I briefly
addressed in Chapter 4, another iteration of the Supreme Court has mentioned before how
the judiciary depends on the executive for help with protection and enforcement (In re
Neagle 1890). Granted, that was a different justice writing on behalf of a different Court,
but the idea still stands true. With the topic of desegregation, and the reluctance of many
people to allow school integration, the justices required further assistance from Congress
and the executive to make their verdict a reality. Southern governmental officials insisted
that only an “army” would be able to bend them to the will of the Supreme Court
(Brandenburg 2004). Thus, the Court needed assistance from Congress and the president
to authorize enforcement and bring changes. Only with further justification from the
other branches and public could the Court’s decision proceed.
Another aspect of the Court’s descriptive legitimacy developed through Brown.
Depending on who is discussed within the idea of “the public,” public opinion started to
change in the mid-1950s. Public outrage towards the administration’s failing measures to
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apply integration to schools drew further criticism for President Eisenhower, which in
turn, made him reconsider his stance on integration (Layton 2007). As Azza Layton
writes in 2007,
“[t]he Eisenhower administration moved reluctantly in its first term. But in the
second term, the 1955 murder of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till, widely
publicized discriminatory sentences by southern state courts, the 1955–1956
Montgomery bus boycott, and, most dramatically, southern defiance of federal
school desegregation orders all generated negative international publicity”
(Layton 2007).

It was not the Supreme Court who eventually moved the executive branch to action. It
was perceived criticism towards the actions of the executive which prompted greater
enforcement. The United States had an international image to uphold after World War II
(Crowe 2012). This, in turn, created a new challenge for the Supreme Court. If the
authority of the judiciary alone was not enough to move the executive to change, then
how could the judiciary alter its responses to be enough to force compliance? Rosenberg
often discusses the helplessness of the Supreme Court during desegregation throughout
his chapters on Brown in The Hollow Hope (Rosenberg 2008). The unique challenge
before the Court was how to litigate a series of cases which relied on people respecting
the Court’s legitimacy in the first place. The Court needed to find a way to gain traction,
and fast.
As the final set of challenges drew closer for the Court, the justices had to handle
both the image of success and the image of defeat tied to the desegregation cases. In
Brown v. Board II (1955), the Supreme Court noted that desegregation should happen
“with all deliberate speed” (Ogletree 2004). The justices’ proclamation held the opposite
effect — it permitted the South to approach desegregation in a slower manner at the cost
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of students’ education (Chen 2006). The misstep of this phrase cost the justices further in
their next attempts to handle desegregation policies. The Court’s own words created a
specific attack for the institution’s reservoir of diffuse support.
The effect of the Court’s vague phrase “all deliberate speed” meant that the Court
had to work even harder to make state governments follow through with integration. In
Cooper v. Aaron (1958) the justices composing the Supreme Court needed to make an
especially powerful statement. Their authority was not respected by those who, according
to normative judicial standards, had an obligation to adhere to the word of the Court
(Cooper v. Aaron 1958; Bartley 1969). The challenge posed in Cooper v. Aaron (1958)
was exactly what I discussed in my intro as one of the most severe threats to Supreme
Court legitimacy. Decisions only matter if others let them. The only way the Supreme
Court can regain legitimacy after this type of attack is by expecting the other branches to
acknowledge the Court as legitimate in the first place. This is why the Court has never
completely lost legitimacy despite all of the challenges it has faced. People keep at least a
minimal level of trust in the Court’s normative justifications.

The Court’s Responses
The first response from the Court was an effort to preserve unity. Once Warren
became the new leader of the Court, he made a persistent effort to get every justice on
board with the Brown decision, and he did this by appealing to the justices from the South
in particular (Cho 1998, Footnote 1, 73). Any dissent had the potential to delegitimize the
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Court’s controversial stance on constitutional civil rights. The unanimity of the Court
only implied the justices’ opinion was the law in Brown’s decision. Now, whether others
adhered to the justices’ message of unanimity was another matter. When unanimity in
Brown was not enough to discourage dissent, the Supreme Court justices took their stance
a step further in Cooper v. Aaron (1958). Cooper asserted that the Court did not merely
impart the sentiment behind the law; the words the justices wrote became the law
(Cooper v. Aaron 1958). The justices’ additional steps in Cooper protected judicial
legitimacy when it was clear unanimity was not enough. Unanimity served as a necessary
condition for the desegregation cases rather than a sufficient one.
The Court then delivered an eleven-page opinion meant to extinguish
racially-charged discrimination within the education system (Clawson and Waltenburg
2009). The response Warren imparted shocked his audience. Although the verdict on
desegregation was fairly expected, the audience could not comprehend the persistent
stance every single justice took in Brown (Hutchinson 1980; Clawson and Waltenburg
2009; Lefberg 1975). The meaning behind Warren’s response reflects an intention to
leave a landmark decision. Warren’s words in Brown served as his attempt to reconcile
the racist stances he had taken in the past (Cho 1998). In order to succeed, Warren
recognized that the decision of Brown required elements which would set it apart.
Warren’s internal goals set the tone for the landmark Supreme Court case, and his
response fueled that of the other justices.
Just as the fight continued for desegregation after Brown, so did the Warren
Court’s replies to specific attacks. Political leaders and members of the public alike
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attacked the Court’s desegregation decisions relentlessly, arguing that it would take “an
army” to force them to comply with Supreme Court jurisprudence, which they also knew
the Court could not command (Brandenburg 2004). The crisis for the justices was clearly
one based in legitimacy — was the authority of the Court’s words enough to compel those
around them? The process of discrediting the Court’s desegregation stance often came
through discrediting the Court itself. The Supreme Court’s resolution to declare such a
controversial opinion posed a risk to the Warren Court. Yet the Chief Justice bore the
burden of that risk for the sake of reconciling a substantial inequality in society (Cho
1998).
By the time Cooper v. Aaron (1958) took place, it was clear that the Supreme
Court’s initial responses were not sufficient. The Court needed more. It was time for an
unprecedented means to occur, one which could finally authorize changes. What
eventually happened, and pushed the other branches to act, was the emphasized unity of
Cooper v. Aaron (1958). In this case, each of the justices signed their name on the
technically unanimous opinion, as though this would reiterate the underlying message of
unity throughout the desegregation cases (Bhagwat 2008). Frankfurter, then, penned a
concurrence calling out Southern judicial officials who had ignored the voice of the
highest legal decision-making body (Cooper v. Aaron 1958). The divided yet united
message of the Supreme Court demonstrated the justices’ reply to the increasing threat to
their authority and legitimacy. Their frustration and legitimacy-based fears came forth in
their actions. The Court had to get bolder over time to impart its legitimacy before it
began to see greater success.
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Impact of the Responses
Brown v. Board (1954) is by no means a perfect case for instigating change. Our
society is still suffering as a result of resistance to the landmark civil rights case.
Regardless, the impact the case left over time created an increase in diffuse support for
the Supreme Court. As Clawson and Waltenburg explain, while referencing Gibson and
Caldeira’s 1992 paper, Brown and the subsequent 1950s and 60s cases brought forth “a
reservoir of good will toward the Court among African Americans, a reservoir that
appears deep enough to endure the high court’s much more tepid support for black
political and legal interests since the 1970s” (Clawson and Waltenburg 2009; Gibson and
Caldeira 1992). The Court used its reservoir of support to influence public opinion. In
turn, Warren’s judicial advocacy fed into more support for the institution at large.
The idea of Brown v. Board (1954) itself, a case that made history for education
and civil rights (Brandenburg 2004), feeds into cultural mythos surrounding the judicial
branch. The judicial branch became a symbol for progress at the cost of society’s false
belief that progress has been fully realized. As Nikhil Pal Singh writes in the book Black
is a Country, “civic myths about the triumph over racial injustice have become central” to
the United States’s narrative of “exceptionalism” and “nationalism” (Singh 2004, 17).
Brown v. Board (1954) and other desegregation cases are one of the “myths” Singh
describes. Cultural imagery of a judiciary that does something, one which achieves
progress, allows the Supreme Court to maintain legitimacy over time. Specific attacks on
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judicial legitimacy are not enough to outweigh diffuse support if the Court comes across
as powerful through landmark cases like Brown.
What contributed to the Supreme Court’s ability to seem powerful was the unity
Warren worked so hard to achieve. Each unanimous decision in desegregation case law,
from Brown v. Board’s (1954) unanimous declaration to Cooper v. Aaron’s (1958)
unanimous concurring majority, sent a resolute message about the Supreme Court’s
refusal to back down on integration cases. Unanimity alone, though, was not enough by
itself to assert the authority of the Court. It was the rule rather than the exception in these
desegregation cases. It became expected (Hutchinson 1980). The Supreme Court had to
take their responses a step further. The individual justices came together as an institution
made of separate voices. The bold decision of Cooper v. Aaron (1958) demonstrated that
the Court has other responses it may apply as a last resort when its typical stances lack
success.
Another impact of the Supreme Court’s stance appeared through descriptive
legitimacy, which occurred in changing social constructions of the public. Before this
decision, only people who were white counted as members of the public, due to the
discriminatory nature of society and legal institutions (Wong 2015). After this decision,
the social definition of “the public” opened to accept more people regardless of race. In
constructions of descriptive legitimacy, or legitimacy based on public opinion, it is
important to note who is included within society’s image of “the public” during a given
time. Not everyone has always been included within this classification due to social
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discrimination (Wong 2015). Brown v. Board (1954) was a critical step in expanding
rights for people as a part of the public.
For descriptive legitimacy in the midst of Brown, one must remember the position
the justices took opposite to the public. Supreme Court justices act in the sphere of elites
and higher academia. Michael Klarman states, “[t]hough justices live in a particular
historical and cultural moment, they are not perfect mirrors of public opinion. Judges
occupy an elite subculture” (Klarman 2004). The elitism of justices must be recognized
further in discussions of descriptive legitimacy and Brown v. Board (1954). The public
was only beginning to shift against segregation by the mid-1900s, but the elites had often
been distancing themselves from segregation since the Post-War period (Bartley 1969).
The Supreme Court, as a body composed of legal, academic elites, frequently acted with
the interests of the elite in mind, rather than the explicit interests of the public (Baum and
Devins 2010; Klarman 2004; Bartley 1969). Thus, considering the shift in descriptive
legitimacy was preceded by a shift in academia, the Court was likely less preoccupied
with the public’s resistance on this matter, and more concerned about the scholarly and
international reputation of segregation when Brown was decided.
In conclusion, the specific attacks facing the Supreme Court reflected centuries of
bitterness and discriminatory ideology. Despite the mythos surrounding the Brown v.
Board (1954) line of cases, racial biases did not disappear after the conclusion of Brown.
It took decades to bring forth comprehensive changes, and additional decades to muddle
progress further. The mythos behind Brown refilled the Court’s reservoir of support as
time passed and the public adjusted their opinion of desegregation. Despite the eventual
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increase of support for the Court over time, it took persistent responses from the Supreme
Court justices to change public opinion. This era serves as a case where legitimacy
drained at first, then came back through the assistance of time and public memory.
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Chapter 6: Polarization in the Modern Court
People often believe that the polarization we see now has reached high, if not
unprecedented, levels in government (Newport 2019; Drutman 2016). However, our
current levels of partisanship are not dissimilar to the partisanship surrounding other
contentious periods. The one major difference is the Court’s method for tackling partisan
bias. Between the late 1980s and 2010s, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have faced
similar challenges and developed a few strategies for combating them. This period is
what I call the Modern Court Era. The challenges are largely descriptive ones, and the
Supreme Court is hyper-aware of its legitimacy as a result. While there are many
similarities between the Modern Court Era and other contentious periods, one significant
difference is Trump’s presidency. Trump poses a unique risk to the Supreme Court
because of the political climate surrounding him. The specific challenges we see in the
Modern Court Era develop different responses for familiar problems.
Multiple issues between the 1960s and the beginning of the Modern Court
brought forth particular challenges to the Supreme Court (Roe v. Wade 1973; Milliken v.
Bradley 1974; US v. Nixon 1974; INS v. Chadha 1983). The Supreme Court faced
questions of implicit rights and unexplained powers throughout the decades separating
Cooper v. Aaron (1958) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). These cases included
Casey’s predecessor Roe v. Wade (1973), and Cooper’s descendant Milliken v. Bradley
(1974). However, as I will argue later in this section, the legitimacy-based challenges
from the period before the Modern Court Era did not significantly threaten judicial
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legitimacy until our current political climate. Those earlier challenges were not perceived
as particularly strong attacks when they occurred. Rather, they increased in magnitude as
time carried on.

Historical Factors
By the 1990s, over two hundred years of precedent existed for constitutional case
law. New issues continued to appear, but many doctrinal lines had strong historical
decisions which came before them. Case decisions wavered between oppositional
mindsets over time, and justices had more leeway when referencing past cases. The Court
can respond to precedent with positive reinforcement or negative limitations, but judicial
decisions frequently rely on elaborating on precedent in some manner (Hansford and
Spriggs II 2006). Over two centuries of legal precedent left different iterations of the
Supreme Court with many positions they could apply to recent majority and dissenting
opinions. This allowed for greater freedom over which case law to apply to certain
circumstances, and in which forms.
Although much of the law could still rely heavily on precedent, one new area of
the law arose from recent technologies. The creation of the public internet, or “World
Wide Web,” in 1989 completely changed the way the judiciary had to view free speech
issues (CERN Editors 2020; Rappaport 1997). Later in the 1990s, the internet’s influence
expanded past colleges and universities to infiltrate the public sphere (Farrell 2012). As
with the introduction of radio, television, and film, the introduction of computers into
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everyday life cultivated both “one-sided and contrasting discourses” (Kellner 1999).
Scholars, politicians, corporations, and the public noticed how the internet permeated into
political discourse. People could access political information from anywhere — news and
speech became uncontainable by the government.
With easier access to governmental information, public opinion seeped into
conversations over political theory and legitimacy. Internet access amplified the threat
posed by descriptive legitimacy. Gibson and Nelson note that Chief Justice Roberts is
“keenly aware” of the role of the Court, especially as it pertains to “public” perception
(Gibson and Nelson 2014). This occurs in part because people could access information
with greater ease in recent times (Gibson and Caldeira 2009, 1). Tolbert and McNeal
write that technological advancements through the internet delivered the content of
political news at the speed of telecommunication devices like phones (Tolbert and
McNeal 2003). The internet revolutionized the way people could view politics.
For the Supreme Court, the accessibility that the internet offers poses a greater
risk. Social media took regular news sources and transformed them into a collaborative,
speed-driven force where news sites can interact with and shape their consumer bases
(Lee 2015). This meant that the Supreme Court encountered further threats from the type
of news reporting on it. As Sill, Metzgar, and Rouse write on the modern threat the Court
faces from the media,
“the importance of media coverage is magnified for the United States Supreme
Court because, lacking the public affairs mechanisms of the other two branches,
the Court is dependent on media dissemination of information about its
decisions” (Sill, Metzgar, and Rouse 2013).
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As the internet contributed to media accessibility, people could self-select the news they
wanted to read with greater ease (Lee 2015). Therefore, they could more easily construct
a personalized view of the government based on what they wanted to hear, subject to
individual biases.
Polarization also increased between 1990 and 2020, and it especially escalated
during the 2016 election. Information technology fueled political propaganda for the left
and right alike. Roger Ailes used television to polarize the American electorate through
his 1996 creation, Fox News (Sherman 2014; Ortiz 2017). He criticized the elitism of
leftist media while demonizing outsiders with “us-or-against-us” rhetoric (Sherman
2014). Social media enhanced opportunities to sharpen ideological divides between the
right and the left by letting people create their own echo chambers (Garimella et al.
2018). For the Supreme Court, partisanship became particularly noticeable after Elena
Kagan replaced John Paul Stevens on the bench in 2010, thus realigning the Supreme
Court by party (Hasen 2013; Baum and Devins 2017). This realignment, otherwise
known as “partisan sorting,” occurred not just within the Supreme Court, but within other
sectors of society (Baum and Devins 2017; Young 2017). Polarization, coupled with
party sorting and echo chambers, made it challenging for the Supreme Court to maintain
its impartial stance that built legitimacy over time.
Just as polarization increased over the last few decades, so did dislike of certain
Supreme Court cases. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Roe v. Wade (1973)
was not as much of an oppositional case at its time, but it became a political talking point
through its subsequent cases in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Preacher Jerry Falwell
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wondered why so few voices were against Roe in the early 1970s, as “[b]oth before and
for several years after Roe, evangelicals were overwhelmingly indifferent to the subject”
(Balmer 2014). Only later did rage build towards the case. Scholars point to different
moments for when people galvanized right-wing Evangelicals through Roe. Professor
Randall Balmer claims the moment was before the Modern Court in 1979, as an attempt
to thwart Carter’s reelection (Balmer 2014). Professor Neal Devins argues the moment
arose in the late 1880s, when Ronald Reagan nominated the “Roe critic” Robert Bork for
the Supreme Court (Devins 2009). Either way, Roe itself was much less polarizing when
the Court decided it than it is now. Right-wing media and politicians transformed this
case into a political matter, then left-wing media followed suit.
By the time 2016 primary candidates started declaring their intent to run, the
nation took a sharp ideological shift to the right. All across the globe, countries
experienced an uptick in right-wing populism brought on by ethno-nationalist policies
and a growing dislike of the elite (Pierson 2017). As with many European nations, the
United States was not immune to this brand of populism. Immigration and disorder are
two common scapegoats in right-wing populist rhetoric, regardless of whether or not
rhetoric matches reality (Millman 2018). Donald Trump, who ran on the campaign slogan
“Make America Great Again,” channeled this nationalist dynamic to win the 2016
election (Nguyen 2019). Trump made references to immigration and crime which fueled
his base, but were inaccurate (Millman 2018). He used right-wing populist rage to gain
support in the 2016 election.
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Donald Trump’s victory shocked the world. For the left, it was a symbol that
society had not moved past discrimination embedded deep within the history of the
United States. America has long suffered from its persistent ties to discrimination, and
the slogan “Make America Great Again” stirs bad memories of the nation’s history
(Nguyen 2019). For the right, it proved that rural-based populism could overcome the
elitism of liberal politics. Donald Trump promised to weed out the “swamp” of politics,
and his base believed he would succeed (Rowland 2019). Populist imagery behind
Donald Trump fueled heightened polarization already in place, and served as a warning
to the judiciary.
In the first few years of his presidency, Donald Trump exercised a type of rule
similar to other presidents in contentious times, such as Jackson and Roosevelt. These
presidents are called a variety of terms for their bold executive stances, from
“oppositional” to “authoritarian” (Whittington 2007; Babones 2018). The promises
Trump made and the actions he attempted go beyond the scope of executive powers.
Trump has promised to build a wall on the Mexican border, ban people from entering the
country based on their religion, lock up Hillary Clinton, and give opioid drug dealers the
death penalty (BBC News Editors 2018; Keneally and Liddy 2017; Diamond 2018). Each
of these promises falls outside the scope of presidential powers. Trump questions the
other branches when they disagree with him, and personally attacks members of the
judiciary and legislature (Brettschneider 2016). The threats he makes on the other
branches draw parallels to the harsh criticism of Jackson or Roosevelt.
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The Court is still widely regarded as an impartial or apolitical branch, but even
the judiciary could not withstand descriptive challenges made towards the other branches
between the 1980s and 2010s. The media is quick to attack members of the executive and
legislative branches, who often dominate political news (Oswald 2009; Baird and Gangl
2006). For the most part, the press pays less attention to the Supreme Court. CSPAN
provides constant monitoring of Congress, and presidential elections receive vast media
coverage (Oswald 2009). Perhaps one explanation behind less frequent coverage of the
Supreme Court is that members of the Court are nominated by the executive, rather than
the public (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). However, as Baird and Gangl explain, it is a
“misperception” to believe “that Court procedures are relatively immune to the politics of
bargaining and compromise” that appear in media portrayals of the other branches (Baird
and Gangl 2006). Judicial challenges have the potential to worsen through media
attention.

Challenges to Supreme Court Legitimacy
Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has faced a myriad of different challenges.
Some of the most pertinent threats are ones which repeat several times during this epoch.
A pattern appears in the types of challenges facing the Modern Court under the leadership
of Rehnquist and Roberts. These legitimacy threats center around the Court’s impartiality
in a polarized and recorded polity (Gibson 2007). Through analyzing the most common
threats facing the Court in the Modern Court Era, a clearer picture arises about legitimacy
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over time, especially as society changes. Descriptive legitimacy challenges are a larger
issue than normative ones for the Modern Court.
The challenges in the 1990s started with a few specific doctrinal issues.
Commerce clause, abortion rights, and free speech issues acquired greater attention from
Supreme Court. Cases such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), RAV v. St. Paul
(1992), US v. Lopez (1995), and Reno v. ACLU (1997) went into new challenges on
familiar issues. The Supreme Court began to notice and change a series of doctrinal lines
in the mid-1990s. For example, Lopez saw changes to previous Commerce Clause
doctrine, but it still left past precedent open for future use (US v. Lopez 1995). What
made the Modern Court pay further attention to these doctrinal issues? As Neal Devins
explains through an analysis of Roe and Casey, partisan actions in the other branches
contributed to the issues facing the Supreme Court at the beginning of the Modern Court
(Devins 2009). The other branches used the judiciary to boost support for themselves at
the cost of specific support for the third branch.
Another set of challenges appeared towards the justices themselves. Robert
Bork’s hearing served as a precursor to future partisan nomination challenges (Kelly and
Cummings 2018). Considering Bork’s harsh stance on Roe v. Wade (1973), people had a
difficult time believing his ability to be impartial (Devins 2009; Kelly and Cummings
2018). Some argue that Bork’s defeat was an indication of the public’s impact over
Supreme Court nominations (Gibson and Caldeira 2009). After the Bork hearings, this
issue repeated for other nominations. Anita Hill testified that Clarence Thomas sexually
harassed her when he was her supervisor (Kelly and Cummings 2018). People doubted
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Hill’s testimony, and Thomas was confirmed (Kelly and Cummings 2018; Gibson and
Caldeira 2009). Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s ability to remain impartial was also questioned,
although she was also confirmed (Simon 2018). Then there is Brett Kavanaugh, who, like
Clarence Thomas, was accused of sexual assault and barely confirmed in his
confirmation hearing (Tatum 2018). Partisanship makes challenges to Supreme Court
justices more frequent in current times.
Within the challenges towards the Supreme Court and the justices loomed the
increasing threat of technological advances. As a branch of government so heavily based
in temporal laws, The Court undertakes a devastating threat from unprecedented
technology. Innovation challenges the very foundation of the Court by merely existing
outside the scope of social expectations. With recent innovations improving information
access, the public gains a greater say in political matters. As Gibson and Caldeira explain,
referring to Supreme Court nominations,
“[t]he role of ordinary people has increased in part owing to the far greater
availability of information about nominees and the confirmation process. In
recent times, cable television has provided extensive coverage of the Senate
hearings, and the public’s pulse is often taken by media polls during the
confirmation period. Evidence from many sources indicates that Americans are
remarkably attentive to and even informed about the actors and issues involved
when a president puts forth a nominee to the nation’s highest court” (Gibson and
Caldeira 2009).

Gibson and Caldeira note above the multifaceted nature of descriptive legitimacy
challenges through media. Although the challenges appear to affect the president and
Senate more explicitly, they also question the validity of the Court as a consequence. As
technology expands to deliver information to the public, so does the public’s capacity to
influence politics in multiple branches. While the initial threat from modern information

104

technology was clear, the role it would play in free speech rights, the secondary threat,
was less obvious. With advancements in information technology came a greater public
capacity to affect politics. People could comment on the Court globally, share their
opinions on news sources, blog about Supreme Court decisions, and express commentary
more readily (Lee 2009). Innovations in this regard created a context for the attacks
facing the Supreme Court, and eventually became a challenge for the Court to overcome.
As the 2000s began, the Court faced additional challenges toward state rights and
federal authority. Federal authority continued to expand, except in a few cases where
political opinion argued otherwise (US v. Lopez 1995; Gonzales v. Raich 2005). State
rights still remain, but the federal government holds more centralized authority than it did
in the past. A new challenge to state and federal authority comes from the coronavirus,
and questions of power that arise from it. Under precedent for state police powers,
quarantine remains an issue for state governments, although the federal government can
claim further powers in national emergencies (Millhiser 2020). The projected economic
downturn from COVID-19 could draw judicial parallels to the New Deal Transition
Period and the Great Depression, when the judiciary faced several challenges over
executive authority and rebuilding society (Orlik et al. 2020; Crowe 2012). Regardless of
the eventual coronavirus outcome, it is clear that federal and state issues remain a
concern for the Modern Court Era.
With increased polarization between the other branches, the Modern Court was
left to mitigate tension-ridden disputes between Democrats and Republicans. To imagine
the judiciary as an impartial branch, people often think of legal cases as external, or
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separate from the politics that otherwise appear in government (Baird and Gangl 2006).
Through cases such as partisan gerrymandering, gay rights, abortion, and the results of
the election itself, the Court must grapple with inevitably political outcomes which need
attention from the judiciary (Rucho v. Common Cause 2019; Obergefell v. Hodges 2015;
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 2016; Bush v. Gore 2000). The Court can apply the
“political question” doctrine to cases it considers too controversial to decide, but the
guidelines for this doctrine lack clear explanation (Cole 2014). The Court is the
decision-making body for other branches on partisan issues, whether it wants to be or not.
Last, but certainly not least, the Modern Court faces a threat from an authoritarian
executive. The Supreme Court has encountered a few other controlling presidents in the
past. Andrew Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt represent different sides to a similar
executive position. Both are powerful executive figures. Nonetheless, the exact threat
posed through Donald Trump goes further than previous executives have before. Trump’s
command of right-wing populism, fueled by his attacks on social media, pose a severe
threat to the judiciary. He has targeted members of the judiciary before, and argued
against decisions which impede his authority (Brettschneider 2016; Trump v. Hawaii
2018). With the President’s ability to control partisan opinions of government, the
Supreme Court continues to face significant threats when the justices dispute his
authority.
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The Court’s Responses
There are four significant responses the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have
employed against specific legitimacy attacks. While some methods appeared in both
iterations of the Supreme Court, others are specific to one Chief Justice’s leadership style.
As a part of increasing public awareness of the Court’s role in politics, a few specific
justices within the Court took on a distinct role in decisions. Each of those roles
constitutes one of the four types of responses. The justices and their strategies shaped the
actions defining the Modern Court Era. Their four methods provide a comprehensive
outlook into the Chief Justices, the Associate Justices, and the increasing awareness of
judicial descriptive legitimacy between both groups.
The first response is one which appeared often in the Rehnquist Court. The
Rehnquist Court prioritized certain cases over others on the docket, shaping political
discourse in the process (Tushnet 2005, 10). The Court, through its use of larger, diffuse
support, can draw greater attention to some legal matters rather than others. This is a
process that Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg term the Supreme Court’s
“legitimacy-conferring authority” (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001). The Court’s
legitimacy-conferring authority allows the Court to control the public’s views on politics,
thereby manipulating the public’s perspective of Supreme Court legitimacy. For example,
in the end of the Rehnquist Court, the justices pushed gay rights issues higher up on
public agenda, while pushing down affirmative action decisions after Gratz and Grutter
(Tushnet 2005, 10). The Roberts Court, then, could reshape the public agenda in a
different way afterwards. By adjusting the public’s perspective on political matters, the
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Court is able to divert attention away from itself and minimize threats posed through
descriptive legitimacy challenges.
Agenda-setting is by no means a new method for dealing with legal cases
(Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001; Tushnet 2005), but the temporal context of the
Rehnquist Court altered this type of approach. With technology’s increased presence in
people’s daily lives, the Court had further opportunities to disseminate judicial
viewpoints to the public (Farganis 2012, 209). Agenda-setting expanded with social
innovations. Whether the Court directly responds to challenges while thinking of the
impact of technology, though, is another matter. It is not clear if the Court intentionally
applies technology’s effects to its words. Some sources imply the opposite, that the Court
avoids using technology as much as it can, and still perceives public opinion through its
typical institutional lens (Thomson-DeVeaux 2018). It is more likely that the Court
implicitly benefits from technological innovations than that it intentionally utilizes them.
The Court uses the justices’ responses to shape descriptive legitimacy, thereby
minimizing the threat public opinion poses.
The most important response from the Court is the second one, which furthers the
importance of the first response. The Modern Court is a restrained branch of government.
The key justices of this era hold themselves back when responding to
legitimacy-threatening challenges. Their reactions are particularly noteworthy when
compared to other eras, with justices that were both activist and united. (Schechter
Poultry Co. v. US 1935; Brown v. Board 1954; Cho 1998). The Court acts with increased
caution now due to heightened polarization and media’s speed with disseminating news.
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As Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth argue, “repeatedly issuing judgments that deviate from
the public’s preferences risks attracting negative attention from the news media, the
public, and other branches of government” (Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011). This is
why the Court cannot afford to make decisions that could incite the public. The spin
given by reporters in a world with heightened accessibility to news makes public opinion
a real and devastating threat.
Chief Justice Roberts most often applies the restraint characterizing the Modern
Court Era. Warren and the Four Horsemen used judicial activism to reclaim legitimacy
(Wright 1968), whereas Roberts exercises judicial restraint in his opinions. As Robert
Barnes elaborates, “Roberts made clear what he does consider his job to be . . . a fierce
defender of the judiciary’s independence and a firm believer in judicial restraint” (Barnes
2016). He is careful to toe the line on certain political matters which pose a severe threat
to the Supreme Court as an institution. It is difficult to say whether Marshall and Taney
were more activist judges or restrained judges — they both developed a leadership style of
deferring to the opposite side to claim victory in the end — but Roberts is much clearer
about his position on the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and his concerns to minimize
public attacks to the Supreme Court. He is a cautious chief.
Perhaps Roberts’s perspective on the Chief Justice position explains the restraint
he applies to certain cases. Roberts abhors partisanship, and admires the legacy Marshall
left as an impartial yet decisive chief (Biskupic 2019). His position is, as Casillas, Enns,
and Wohlfarth argue, a part of the institutional responsibility he bears in his role as a
justice. The authors state that “individual justices have an institutional incentive to think
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about the context in which they make decisions, and this context includes public opinion”
(Casillas, Enns, and Wohlfarth 2011). For John Roberts, the institutional role he takes is
not only that of a justice; he is the Chief Justice, the first among equals (Biskupic 2019;
Schmidt and Yalof 2004). Richard Hasen elaborates on why Roberts’s institutional role
guides his thoughts on legitimacy, due to recent partisan disputes over gerrymandering
and the census citizenship question (Hasen 2019; Shapiro 2019). Hasen stated in 2019,
“there’s going to be real pressure for the institutionalist John Roberts to be dominant,” the
version of the Chief Justice “who is desperate to show that there remains a distinction
between law and politics” (Hasen 2019). When partisan disputes arise, Roberts feels a
responsibility to be more cautious of how the Court appears in the public eye.
While restraint most often appears in Chief Roberts’s actions, it also appears in
the actions of a few other key justices. Before Roberts became the median political vote,
Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy acted as the “key” or swing vote on the bench
(Biskupic 2019). There is significant dispute within legal scholarship over whether
Kennedy truly was a “swing” vote in his time on the Supreme Court (Schmidt and Yalof
2004; Parshall 2007; Enns and Wohlfarth 2013). Yet, during his tenure on the bench, he is
most often credited as the deciding vote between the liberals and conservatives. Sandra
Day O’Connor was thought of as a deciding vote before Kennedy, and she also
contributed significantly to the direction of the Modern Court (Parshall 2007). Having at
least one justice who exercises restraint and varies opinion makes the Supreme Court
seem more impartial as an institution.
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The third significant response of the Modern Court is the Roberts Court’s 5-4
response to polarized cases. Granted, there is still a preponderance of unanimous cases in
many matters (Turberville and Marcum 2018). However, the Roberts Court has an
increasing tendency to decide close, polarized cases with a 5-4 vote, largely split down
party lines (Biskupic 2019). Now, this choice is often unintentional for most of the
justices, but the justice casting the deciding vote grapples with the impact on legitimacy
in his or her decision. Some of the biggest examples of this occurring include NFIB v.
Sebelius (2012), Citizens United v. FEC (2010), Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), Herrera v.
Wyoming (2018), and Rucho v. Common Cause (2019). It is also common for one of the
conservative justices to “switch” and deliver a victory for the liberals in these cases
(Thomson-DeVeaux 2019). Each of these cases covered a critical issue that divided the
public, from health care, to partisan gerrymandering, to gay marriage. There is a common
trend in the Modern Court to render close decisions on such matters. The next couple of
paragraphs explain why this occurs.
As the previous chapter details, unanimity sends a strong message to those who
would dissent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. Arguably, the opinion of a
unanimous Court carries with it the full force of the law, more so than divided decisions
(Hutchinson 1980; Greenhouse 2020). If the Court instead hands down a 5-4 decision,
various parties would have greater justification in ignoring the ruling. Close decisions
provide a greater possibility to see reversal in the future. After all, the justices of the
highest Court themselves were split on the matter, and even the winning side could not
sway the other four justices (Schwartz 2018). Because of existing polarization in the
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modern polity, the Court is wise to leave politically charged cases as close decisions, thus
sending the message that the law could be switched back in the future. These decisions
appease factions as a result.
The Roberts Court’s frequent application of 5-4 decisions demonstrates some of
the justices’ already explicit awareness of judicial legitimacy. Roberts has already hinted
to his attention to legitimacy both in his concerns over the “status and integrity” of the
judiciary, and in the tone he read Elizabeth Warren’s question of legitimacy during
Trump’s impeachment procedures (Fuentes-Rohwer 2018; Creitz 2020). Other justices
serving on the Supreme Court, both liberals and conservatives alike, have discussed the
concerns they have about public perception of the Supreme Court, such as Kagan, as
appears in the Introduction (Page 2018). These justices show in their actions that they are
at least partially aware of the role legitimacy plays in the judiciary.
Contentious matters are already likely to increase coverage of a Supreme Court
case, thereby drawing public attention to the Court. Yet these close decisions also draw
greater publicity, making the public believe the Court is more impartial than it actually is.
Sill, Metzgar, and Rouse write, “as the number of dissenting justices increases, it serves
as a greater signal of both newsworthiness and legal significance” and “a four judge
dissent increases the probability of NYT coverage by 3.3%” (Sill, Metzgar, and Rouse
2013). The public, then, is more likely to see the Court as a branch that renders close
decisions, thus as a branch that gives more validity to both sides of an issue. The justices,
who already state their awareness of legitimacy in other contexts, might let legitimacy
influence their decisions over close matters. If this does occur, it likely only happens for a
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few key justices, such as Roberts, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Gorsuch. However, it is
impossible to prove this inference without the justices explicitly stating that their
awareness of legitimacy influences the decisions they render. This is a limitation of
research conducted in this area.
The final type of response from the Modern Court is their reference to multiple
sides in the same line of doctrine. The fourth method, paired with the Court’s application
of 5-4 decisions for contentious cases, gives people the message that outcomes they
disagree with are likely to change in the future. The possibility of dissent and reversal
appeases factions in a polarized climate (Moran 2019). People see motivation in
dissenting justices who represent their opinions. Part of the reason why the Court might
waver in lines of doctrine has to do with availability. The Court has seen a variety of
decisions in the centuries that it has covered doctrinal cases (Hansford and Spriggs II
2006). For many cases, this means the Court has precedent to turn to if it wishes to
reverse its current position. The Court’s recent trend of leaving cases open for future
possibilities gives factions hope in a time of polarization and dissonance.

Impact of the Responses
The quiet, legitimacy-driven aspect to the Court’s responses signifies the justices’
deference to descriptive legitimacy. The Court sees the public as a looming threat to its
authority, and perhaps even its existence (Gibson and Nelson 2014). This is the reason
why some of the key justices hesitate to follow through with confrontations towards the
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other branches. The Court wishes to be viewed positively in the public eye, thus it
exercises more restraint and gives voice to dissenting factions. Although this may well
occur unintentionally, there are clear ramifications for the Court’s legitimacy as a result
of the justices’ actions.
The Modern Court’s 5-4 decisions imply that impartiality is connected to
legitimacy. Or, at the very least, the justices view the guise of impartiality as essential for
their legitimacy (Loewenstern 2003). This stands in stark contrast to some of the previous
eras, where the Supreme Court took resolute stances on one side of the aisle or the other
to acquire further legitimacy. As mentioned above, I think that this is due to the
ever-present role media plays in people’s everyday lives, and the internet’s effect on
polarization. In the Early National Period and the Civil War Era, unanimity was still
valued, but the Court released layered decisions. The New Deal Era and Desegregation
Period saw strength in unanimity, where the justices fought as one for distinct outcomes.
The Modern Court Era is different because the Court’s key strategy is to fuel dissent. 5-4
decisions let polarized factions see each case as a potential victory (Schwartz 2018).
Thus, in an era surrounded by descriptive legitimacy threats, the Supreme Court is able to
rely on its diffuse support to get past specific challenges.
Conservative justices play an interesting role in the Modern Court’s 5-4
responses. The 5-4 switch most often occurs with a conservative justice switching to the
liberal side. Various scholars see that conservative justices are more likely than liberal
justices to “miss” the intentions of the president appointing them (Bartels 2016). While
liberal justices are more likely to align with the intentions of liberal presidents,
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conservative justices are more likely to swing in opinion. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux
even writes that the current Supreme Court has not one, but three justices who qualify as
“swing” justices based on their voting records (Thomson-DeVeaux 2019). Swing justices
come from the conservative side as a result of continued majorities on the Supreme Court
(Biskupic 2019). Swing conservative justices allow for the Supreme Court to preserve its
legitimacy through implied impartiality.
By leaving doctrinal lines open, Supreme Court justices may refer to various
cases as they see fit. Recent decisions do not dismiss the chance of reversal. They open
the door to future cases instead (Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1992; Wickard v. Filburn
1942; US v. Lopez 1995; Gundy v. US 2019). When a line of doctrine reverses without
being fully overturned, it provides the Court a chance to expand on precedent, and choose
that which most applies to a given circumstance. Precedent continues to build and adjust
to society’s needs over time (Hansford and Spriggs II 2006). One might argue that the
Supreme Court looks weaker upon changing its mind or altering doctrinal lines.
However, it looks stronger by appeasing factions in a time of heightened partisanship. If
anything, the possibility of reversal helps maintain diffuse support for the Supreme Court.
Donald Trump’s command over right-wing media, and his attacks on the
judiciary, reflect a particularly severe challenge for the Court. As an oppositional leader,
he poses a threat to the Court and people’s perception of it. His actions are similar to
those of other oppositional presidents (Babones 2018), yet he also represents a unique
risk for the Supreme Court. His direct challenges towards the rule of law, mixed with his
ability to command media attention, endanger the judiciary as an institution. He does not
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back down from direct challenges to individual justices, and represents a considerable
populist faction of the American public (Brettschneider 2016; Millman 2018). His
unpredictability continues to cause concern for the justices, which does not go unnoticed
by others in government (Creitz 2020). The Modern Court is already cautious, yet the
justices have more reason to guard their actions amidst the current executive.
Public opinion, assisted through social media and other recent advancements, has
become the most significant threat to judicial legitimacy over time. It links into all the
other challenges listed above, and will likely remain a heightened threat for many years
to come. Normative legitimacy challenges encompassed issues for the past, now
descriptive legitimacy challenges do so for the present. The justices continue to use
caution because they are afraid of how the public will perceive their actions. Technology
advancements, polarization, and public opinion make for a fearsome trifecta for
descriptive judicial legitimacy.
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Conclusion
A historical perspective on recent legitimacy challenges demonstrates how the
Supreme Court’s responses have developed over time. Similar challenges exist in
different temporal contexts. From handling authoritarian executives to mitigating conflict
between branches of government, the Court survived many of the same challenges in its
existence. It seems strange that a body so dependent on legitimacy and intangible
constructs can persist past real, perceptible threats. Yet it does, often because the Court
responds carefully to each challenge based on temporal factors. The following section
will dive further into the conclusions from the previous chapters, connecting them further
and explaining links between eras.
Table 2: Contextual Factors by Period
* No X does not mean this factor was not present, but it did not significantly impact legitimacy
** A gray X connotes that a legitimacy-based argument could be made, but comparatively less so
Early National
Period
Authoritarian Executive

Civil War Era

New Deal
Transition
Period

X

X

Desegregation
Period

Modern
Court
X

Justice Attacks

X

X

X

X

X

Factions

X

X

X

X

X

Polarization

X

X

Technological
Advancements

X

Oppositional Court

X

X

Less Precedent

X

X

Race and Civil Rights
Issues
Federal vs. State Powers

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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First, I must readdress the specifics of each time period, and why they pertain to
the larger discussion at hand. To assist with this analysis, above is Table 2, which covers
which individual issues appeared in which legitimacy-based time periods. Each factor
that impacted the Court’s legitimacy challenges is marked with an “X” for that time
period. The key factors for the Early National Period were the inception of the Supreme
Court and Constitution, the factions of the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, the
polarization between both groups, and Chief Justice Marshall’s role against President
Jefferson. For the Civil War Era, the most important historical factors were the division
between the North and the South, the civil and human rights issues, and the Supreme
Court’s role in the midst of it all. During the New Deal Transition Period, the key factors
were the Great Depression, FDR’s presidency, information innovation, and public
opinion changes. For the Desegregation Period, the key contextual aspects were racial
issues, the Court’s oppositional role, and public outcry to progress. The Modern Court
Era has handled disputes over individual justices, Trump’s presidency, information
technology advancements, and polarization. These were the primary influences on
legitimacy-based attacks for each respective period.
Next, a couple of links tie together some of the periods. To start, there are a few
connections between chronological periods. In the Early National Period and Civil War
Era, the Court gained more by taking clandestine, bolder stances. Preserving unity and
developing the judiciary were the most significant goals of the Court. Thus, the Supreme
Court justices would render decisions in favor of one faction, with the outcome
eventually benefitting both the other faction and the judiciary. This would allow the Court
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to continue making decisions without facing significant uproar from either faction. In the
New Deal Transition Period and the Brown Era, the Court stood in opposition to the
public and the other branches of government. Both times it served the Court better to
progress society forward. That meant caving to the public in the former era, and standing
against it in the latter, no matter the immediate cost to support. The Modern Court applies
some aspects of the previous Courts to its position, but ultimately, the restraint exercised
by the Chief Justices now make it more of an outlier comparatively.
There are also a few non-chronological links which are important to mention. The
first would be the racial link between the Civil War Era and the Desegregation Period. In
both periods the Supreme Court used racial issues to boost judicial legitimacy. For the
Civil War Era, the Supreme Court dismissed civil rights issues to prevent Southern
secession, and this came at the cost of massive rights violations. In the Desegregation
Period, the Supreme Court also used racial issues to boost its diffuse support over time.
Efforts endorsing more equal treatment and reversing previous decisions made the Court
seem more valid over time. Warren had the intention of making the Court better on racial
issues, but the true impact of Brown’s doctrine came as decades passed. By reversing
previous precedent on racial issues, the Supreme Court constructed legitimacy for itself
across time periods.
Unlike the clear connection between the Civil War Era and the Desegregation
Period, a surprising trend appears in Table 2 between two periods which seem less
connected. The Modern Court Era almost mirrors the Civil War Era for historical factors
impacting legitimacy. However, it is worth noting that the magnitude of each factor is
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quite disparate between the two time periods. The most important factors for one are less
important for the other, or apply to a separate set of circumstances. For example,
partisanship was more violent in the Civil War Era. Furthermore, some of the greatest
discrepancies between the two times happen as a result of the factors which do not
overlap. Technological advancements are essential to comprehending the Modern Court
Era’s responses to legitimacy crises. The Modern Court may differ from the various
Courts acting in the Civil War Era in these few respects, but these specific factors
contribute significantly to each Supreme Court’s responses.
As the past few paragraphs imply, contextual factors guide the Court’s responses
to a given circumstance. This is why my thesis took such a historical focus, and why the
Court has continued to exist past threats to its legitimacy. To look only at recent
responses would miss much of the framework responsible for constructing them. It would
be difficult to explain the pertinence of Trump’s presidency to legitimacy without
addressing similar challenges from Andrew Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt.
Furthermore, when looking at the studies of responses in the previous chapters, it seems
that combinations of multiple historical factors dictate the justices’ responses. That is,
singular contextual factors appear to have less of a commanding role on responses than
combined ones. It was the combination of the Great Depression, FDR’s presidency,
telecommunication devices, and the Court-packing plan which drove the judiciary’s
responses in the New Deal Era. Likewise, the Modern Court is responding to a divided
public, information innovation, Trump’s presidency, and so-called “cancel” culture
(Cillizza 2019). Various factors influence the Court’s responses by themselves, but it is
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the culmination of two or more factors which most impact judicial actions, especially
those of greater magnitude.
Finally, by linking time periods together as a cohort, a trend appears in the type of
legitimacy challenges faced by the Court. The threats have grown increasingly
descriptive over time, culminating into the challenges faced by the Roberts Court today.
Two hypotheses explaining this trend appear in the chapters above. First, the Supreme
Court, as a body dependent on precedent, gains more normative legitimacy as time
passes. It becomes harder to challenge judicial authority as this authority builds over
time. The Early National Period and Civil War Era faced more normative attacks because
the nation was still developing and under constant threat. The later periods, by contrast,
featured more challenges to judicial strength than to judicial existence. Second,
information access and social media have altered society so that public opinion bears
more weight on politics. As stated in Chapters 4 and 6, advancements in opinion polls
and media formats made it less difficult to tell what the public thought of political
matters. This, in turn, gave descriptive legitimacy more weight over normative legitimacy
over time. Between time and innovation, descriptive legitimacy eventually posed a
greater risk to the Court than normative legitimacy.
The responses themselves vary based on polarization and faction-based issues.
The period where the justices were the least restrained would be the Desegregation
Period, where the bench stood in stark opposition to the other branches, the state
governments, and much of society. Polarization was less of a legitimacy-based concern in
the 1950s compared to some of the other time periods, although it certainly existed then
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as well. The Court is most restrained in the current period, under Roberts’s leadership in
the Modern Court Era. Because faction is so high over political matters, and the factions
remain closely split, the Supreme Court risks angering vast populations if the justices
take a more activist approach. Otherwise, the Early National Period and Civil War Era
Courts were a mixture of activist and restrained, while the New Deal Transition Period
Court was more activist than restrained, although it eventually caved to societal
perspectives. This is how the types of responses have varied over time. The justices
adapted to meet normative and descriptive needs in society. It is better to apply more
restraint in times with greater polarization, whereas it is better to apply activism in times
when divides are not as sharp.
If the Court continues to follow current trends, what might the Court’s
legitimacy-based actions look like in the future? It is difficult to predict the exact
direction the Court will head, especially without knowing what problems society will
face in the next few decades. Legitimacy issues keep changing over time, as do the
Supreme Court’s tools for responding to them. Perhaps descriptive legitimacy will
continue to pose a greater threat than normative legitimacy, but one cannot be certain
without knowing social contexts. Societal changes can be as abrupt and unexpected as the
COVID-19 outbreak. This virus could leave devastating effects on the economy and it
raises further questions about emergency powers in our democracy (Chinni 2020; Cathey
2020; Millhiser 2020). The coronavirus and its predicted effects parallel many features of
the Great Depression’s effects on society. I would not be surprised if the disease and
response to it brought about a new era for Supreme Court legitimacy.
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Without knowing what circumstances will surround the nation, one cannot
definitively state what responses will look like in the future. However, it is still possible
to predict that descriptive legitimacy concerns are likely to remain strong, so long as
public opinion carries comparable weight in future years. Perhaps the Supreme Court
could see a rise in federal power cases after COVID-19. Or, alternatively, the Court could
stay with its more restrained efforts that it applies now, even in the face of a global crisis.
I do think that public opinion will continue to outweigh normative concerns, regardless of
what happens with the virus. Otherwise, the rest remains difficult to predict for future
eras.

123

References
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
Amar, Akhil Reed. 1992. “The bill of rights and the fourteenth amendment.” The Yale
Law Journal 101 (6): 1193-1284.
Babones, Salvatore. 2018. The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism, and the Tyranny
of Experts. Cambridge, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Badas, Alex. 2019. “Policy Disagreement and Judicial Legitimacy: Evidence from the
1937 Court-Packing Plan.” The Journal of Legal Studies 48 (2): 377-408.
Baird, Vanessa and Amy Gangl. 2006. “Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of
the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of Fairness.”
Political Psychology 27 (4): 597-614.
Balkin, Jack M and Sanford Levinson. 2003. “What are the Facts of Marbury v.
Madison?” Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 243: 1-36.
Ball, Molly and Tessa Berenson. 2018. “Brett Kavanaugh’s Confirmation Fight Exposes
Major Problems with the Nation’s Most Powerful Court.” Time Magazine,
September 27. https://time.com/5407920/supreme-court-problems/
Balmer, Randall. 2014. “The Real Origins of the Religious Right.” Politico Magazine,
May 27.
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-real-origins-107
133
Barnes, Robert. 2016. “Roberts emphasizes high court’s restraint, independence.”
Washington Post, May 7.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/chief-justice-says-independe
nce-and-restraint-should-be-high-courts-guiding-lights/2016/05/07/c42fdf5c-139d
-11e6-8967-7ac733c56f12_story.html
Barnett, Randy E. 2007. “The People or the State?: Chisholm v. Georgia and Popular
Sovereignty.” Virginia Law Review 93 (7): 1729-1758.
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
Bartels, Brandon. 2016. “When Was the Last Supreme Court Nomination in Which
Stakes Were This High? Maybe Never.” Washington Post Monkey Cage, February
25.
www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/25/when-was-the-lastsupreme-court-nomination-in-which-stakes-were-this-high-maybe-never/
Bartels, Brandon L. and Christopher D. Johnston. 2013. “On the Ideological Foundations
of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public.” American Journal of
Political Science 57 (1): 184-199.
Bartley, Numan V. 1969. The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South
During the 1950's. LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999 ed.
Baum, Lawrence. 2006. “Thinking About Judicial Behavior.” Judges and Their
Audiences: A Perspective on Judicial Behavior. Princeton University Press.

124

Baum, Lawrence and Neal Devins. 2010. “Why the Supreme Court Cares about Elites,
Not the American People.” Georgetown Law Journal 98 (6): 1515-1582.
Baum, Lawrence and Neal Devins. 2017. “Split Definitive: How Party Polarization
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court.” The Supreme Court Review
2016: 301-365.
BBC News Editors. 2018. “Trump's campaign promises - has he delivered on them?”
BBC News, December 24. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37982000
Bhagwat, Ashutosh. 2008. “Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism.” St. Louis
University Law Journal 52 (4): 1087-1114.
Biskupic, Joan. 2019. The Chief: The Life and Turbulent Times of Chief Justice John
Roberts. NY: Basic Books.
Bloch, Susan Low. 2001. “The Marbury Mystery: Why Did William Marbury Sue in the
Supreme Court?” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications: 607-627.
Bradburn, Douglas. 2008. “A clamor in the public mind: Opposition to the Alien and
Sedition Acts.” The William and Mary Quarterly 65 (3): 565-600.
Brady, David. 2018. “Polls: Opinions on Kavanaugh Grew More Entrenched.” Real
Clear Politics, October 6.
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2018/10/06/polls_opinions_on_kavanau
gh_grew_more_entrenched.html
Brandenburg, Bert. 2004. “Brown v. Board of Education and Attacks on the Courts: Fifty
Years Ago, Fifty Years Later.” Justice at Stake, The Brennan Center: 1-9.
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Brown%20v.%20Board%20of%
20Education%20Attacks%20on%20the%20Courts%2C%2050%20Years%20Ago
%2C%2050%20Years%20Later.pdf
Bressman, Lisa Schultz. 2000. “Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State.” The Yale Law Journal 109 (6): 1399-1442.
Brettschneider, Corey. 2016. “Trump vs. the Constitution: A Guide.” Politico Magazine,
August 4.
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/08/2016-donald-trump-constitutio
n-guide-unconstitutional-freedom-liberty-khan-214139
Breyer, Stephen. 2007. “Judicial Independence: Remarks by Justice Breyer.” Georgetown
Law Journal 95 (4): 903-908.
Broomall, James J. 2019. “Chapter 2: Soldiers.” Private Confederacies: The Emotional
Worlds of Southern Men as Citizens and Soldiers. NC: University of North
Carolina Press.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Brownell, Herbert. 1995. “Civil Rights in the 1950's.” Tulane Law Review 69 (3):
781-792.
Bruton, Elizabeth. 2006. “Marconi Collection: History.” MHS Marconi Collection.
https://www.mhs.ox.ac.uk/marconi/collection/history.php
Brutus. 1788. “Anti-Federalist 78.” “Brutus's” 15th essay of The New-York Journal
collected by the University of Tulsa.
http://resources.utulsa.edu/law/classes/rice/Constitutional/AntiFederalist/78.htm

125

Buchanan, Allen. 2018. “Institutional Legitimacy.” Oxford Studies in Political
Philosophy, ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and Steven Wall, 4: 1-25.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Caldeira, Gregory A. 1987. “Public Opinion and The U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's
Court-Packing Plan.” The American Political Science Review 81 (4): 1139-1153.
Caldeira, Gregory A. and James L. Gibson. 1992. “The Etiology of Public Support for the
Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political Science 36 (3): 635-664.
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
Casillas, Christopher J., Peter K. Enns, and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2011. “How Public
Opinion Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Journal of Political
Science 55 (1): 74-88.
Cathey, Libby. 2020. “Trump declares national emergency responding to coronavirus:
Here's what that means.” ABC News, March 13.
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-declares-national-emergency-responding-c
oronavirus-heres-means/story?id=69586419
CERN Editors. 2020 “The birth of the Web.” CERN.
https://home.cern/science/computing/birth-web
Chen, Jim. 2006. “With All Deliberate Speed: Brown II and Desegregation's Children.”
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice 24 (1): 1-7.
Chinni, Dante. 2020. “Adding it up: Coronavirus to leave deep impact on economy.”
NBC News, March 15.
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/meet-the-press/adding-it-coronavirus-leave-de
ep-impact-economy-n1159356
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
Cho, Sumi. 1998. “Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren,
Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption.” Boston College Third World Law
Journal 19 (1): 73-170.
Choper, Jesse H. 1980. Judicial Review and the National Political Process. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Choudhry, Sujit. 2012. “Civil War, Ceasefire, Constitution: Some Preliminary Notes.”
Cardozo Law Review 33 (5): 1907-1922.
Cillizza, Chris. 2019. “What Barack Obama gets exactly right about our toxic ‘cancel’
culture.” CNN, October 30.
https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/30/politics/obama-cancel-culture/index.html
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Clawson, Rosalee A. and Eric N. Waltenburg. 2009. “Legitimacy and American
Democracy.” Legacy and Legitimacy: Black Americans and the Supreme Court.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Clawson, Rosalee A., Elizabeth R. Kegler, and Eric N. Waltenburg. 2001. “The
Legitimacy-conferring Authority of the U.S. Supreme Court.” American Politics
Research 29 (6): 566-591.

126

Coblenz, Michael. 2006. “The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and
the Rise of Presidential Democracy, By Bruce Ackerman.” The Federal Lawyer,
August Edition: 49-52.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
Cole, Jared P. 2014. “The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability and the Separation of
Powers.” Congressional Research Service: 1-25.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43834.pdf
Comiskey, Michael. 1994. “Can a President Pack - or Draft - the Supreme Court - FDR
and the Court in the Great Depression and World War II.” Albany Law Review 57
(4): 1043-1060.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14 (1800).
Creitz, Charles. 2020. “Roberts visibly reacts to Warren's impeachment question about
his ‘legitimacy’ without trial witnesses.” Fox News, January 30.
https://www.foxnews.com/media/sen-elizabeth-warren-john-roberts-impeachment
-question-about-legitimacy-of-chief-justice
Crowe, Justin. 2012. Building the Judiciary: Law, Courts, and the Politics of Institutional
Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Currie, David. 1982. “Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal
Courts, 1801-1835.” University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound 49 (1):
646-724.
Devins, Neal. 2009. “How ‘Planned Parenthood v. Casey’ (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars.” The Yale Law Journal 118 (7): 1318-1354.
Diamond, Dan. 2018. “Exclusive: Trump finalizing opioid plan that includes death
penalty for dealers.” Politico, March 15.
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/15/exclusive-trump-finalizing-opioid-pla
n-death-penalty-418488
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
Drutman, Lee. 2016. “American politics has reached peak polarization.” Vox, March 24.
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/3/24/11298808/american-politics-peak-pola
rization
Enns, Peter K. and Patrick C. Wohlfarth. 2013. “The swing justice.” The Journal of
Politics 75 (4): 1089-1107.
Epstein, Richard. 2006. How Progressives Rewrote the Constitution. DC: Cato Institute.
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1869).
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
Fairclough, Adam and Rodney Tasker. 2007. “Separate and unequal.” Wilson Quarterly
90-92.
Fallon, Richard H. Jr. 2003. “Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay
on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension.” California Law Review 91 (1): 1-55.
Fallon, Richard H. Jr. 2018. “Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law
in a Populist Age.” Texas Law Review 96 (3): 487-553.
Farganis, Dion. 2012. “Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme
Court Legitimacy.” Political Research Quarterly 65 (1): 206-216.
127

Farrell, Henry. 2012. “The Consequences of the Internet for Politics.” Annual Review of
Political Science 15: 35-52.
Farrow, Ronan and Jane Mayer. 2018. “A Sexual-Misconduct Allegation Against the
Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Stirs Tension among Democrats in
Congress.” The New Yorker, September 14.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-sexual-misconduct-allegation-agai
nst-the-supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-stirs-tension-among-democrats-i
n-congress
Faust, Drew G. 2008. This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War. NY:
Vintage Press.
Finkelman, Paul. 2013. Congress and the Crisis of the 1850s. Ohio University Press.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
Foner, Eric. 2012. “The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction — and Vice
Versa.” Columbia Law Review 112 (7): 1585-1606.
Fowler, James H. and Sangick Jeon. 2008. “The authority of Supreme Court precedent.”
Social Networks 30 (1): 16-30.
Friedman, Barry. 2009. The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the
Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution, ed. Farrar, Strauss
and Giroux. NY: D&M Publishers.
Fuentes-Rohwer, Luis. 2018. “Taking Judicial Legitimacy Seriously.” Chicago-Kent Law
Review 93 (2): 505-524.
Garimella, Kiran et al. 2018. “Political discourse on social media: Echo chambers,
gatekeepers, and the price of bipartisanship.” Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide
Web Conference: 913-922. https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3178876.3186139
Gibson, James L. 2007. “The Legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court in a
Polarized Polity.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Forthcoming. Version 1.23.
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/stuff_for_blog/gibson.pdf7
Gibson, James L. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 1992. “Blacks and the United States Supreme
Court: Models of Diffuse Support.” Journal of Politics 54 (4): 1120-1145.
Gibson, James L. and Gregory A. Caldeira. 2009. “The Public and Supreme Court
Nominations.” Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations: Positivity Theory and the
Judgments of the American People. Princeton University Press.
Gibson, James L. and Michael J. Nelson. 2014. “The Legitimacy of the US Supreme
Court: Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto.” Annual Review of
Law and Social Science 10: 201-219.
Gibson, James, L., Milton Lodge, and Benjamin Woodson. 2014. “Losing, but Accepting:
Legitimacy, Positivity Theory, and the Symbols of Judicial Authority.” Law and
Society Review 48 (4): 837-866.
Gillman, Howard, Mark Graber, and Keith Whittington. 2017. American
Constitutionalism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Graber, Mark A. 1998. “Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and Party
Politics.” Studies in American Political Development 12 (2): 229-266.
Graber, Mark A. 2003. “Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of
1789.” Tulsa Law Review 38 (4): 609-650.
128

Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Greenhouse, Linda. 2020. “A Precedent Overturned Reveals a Supreme Court in Crisis.”
New York Times, April 23.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/opinion/supreme-court-precedent.html
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Grosskopf, Anke and Jeffery J. Mondak. 1998. “Do Attitudes toward Specific Supreme
Court Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on Public
Confidence in the Supreme Court.” Political Research Quarterly 51 (3): 633-654.
Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449 (1841).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Gundy v. United States, No. 17-6086, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
Hamilton, Alexander. 1788. “Federalist 78.” Federalist Papers, collected by Yale Avalon
Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed78.asp
Hansford, Thomas G. and James F. Spriggs II. 2006. The politics of precedent on the US
Supreme Court. NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hardman, John. 1999. “The Great Depression and the New Deal.” Stanford EDGE, July
26. https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/poverty_prejudice/soc_sec/hgreat.htm
Hasen, Richard L. 2013. “End of the Dialogue: Political Polarization, the Supreme Court,
and Congress.” Southern California Law Review 86 (2): 205-262.
Hasen, Richard L. 2019. “Roberts’ Rules.” Slate, March 25.
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/john-roberts-supreme-court-gerryman
dering-cases.html
Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
Herrera v. Wyoming, No. 17-532, 587 U.S. ___ (2019).
Hibbing, John R. and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. “Process Preferences and American
Politics: What the People Want Government to Be.” The American Political
Science Review 95 (1): 145-153.
Hillman, Elizabeth L. 2008. “Franklin D. Roosevelt, Commander in Chief.” Cardozo Law
Review 29 (3): 1037-1048.
History.com Editors. 2019. “This Day in History: Thomas Jefferson is elected.”
History.com, July 28.
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/thomas-jefferson-is-elected
Ho, Daniel E. and Kevin M. Quinn. 2010. “Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?” Journal of
Legal Analysis 2 (1): 69-113.
Houpt, David W. 2013. “John Adams and the Elections of 1796 and 1800.” A Companion
to John Adams and John Quincy Adams, ed. David Waldstreicher. MA: John
Wiley & Sons: 142-165.
Huebner, Timothy S. 2010. “Roger B. Taney and the Slavery Issue: Looking
beyond—and before—Dred Scott.” The Journal of American History 97 (1):
17-38.
Hutchinson, Dennis J. 1980. “Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court, 1948-1958.” University of Chicago Law School Chicago
Unbound and Georgetown Law Journal 68 (1): 1-96.
Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796).
129

Ifill, Sherrilyn A. 2002. “Do Appearances Matter: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Gore.” Maryland Law Review 61 (3): 606-651.
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
Johnson, Joel A. 2004. “Disposed to Seek Their True Interests: Representation and
Responsibility in Anti-Federalist Thought.” The Review of Politics 66 (4):
649-673.
Kaczorowski, Robert J. 2004. “The Supreme Court and Congress's Power Enforce
Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly.” Fordham Law Review 73
(1): 153-243.
Kerber, Linda K. 1970. Federalists in Dissent: Imagery and Ideology in Jeffersonian
America. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kelly, Erin and William Cummings. 2018. “7 contentious Supreme Court confirmation
battles.” USA Today, September 17.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/09/17/7-contentious-supreme
-court-confirmation-battles/1336766002/
Kellner, Douglas. 1999. “New Technologies: Technocities and the Prospects for
Democratization.” Technocities, ed. John Downey and Jim McGuigan. London,
UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.
Keneally, Meghan and Tom Liddy. 2017. “Donald Trump promise tracker: Where his
pledges stand at the 100-day mark.” ABC News, May 5.
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-promise-tracker-pledges-stand/stor
y?id=44902688
Klarman, Michael J. 2004. From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the
Struggle for Racial Equality. NY: Oxford University Press.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Larson, Carlton F. 2011. “What if Chief Justice Fred Vinson Had Not Died of a Heart
Attack in 1953: Implications for Brown and Beyond.” Indiana Law Review 45
(1): 131-158.
Lasser, William. 1988. Limits of Judicial Power: The Supreme Court in American
Politics. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Layton, Azza. 2007. “International Pressure and the U.S. Government’s Response to
Little Rock.” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly 66 (2): 243-257.
Lee III, Emery G. 1997. “Representation, virtue, and political jealousy in the
Brutus-Publius dialogue.” The Journal of Politics 59 (4): 1073-1095.
Lee, Angela M. 2015. “Social Media and Speed-Driven Journalism: Expectations and
Practices.” International Journal on Media Management 17 (4): 217-239.
Lee, Rachel C. 2009. “Ex Parte Blogging: The Legal Ethics of Supreme Court Advocacy
in the Internet Era.” Stanford Law Review 61 (6): 1535-1572.
Lefberg, Irving F. 1975. “Chief Justice Vinson and the Politics of Desegregation.” Emory
Law Journal 24 (2): 243-312.
Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
Lemieux, Scott E. 2003. “The Exception That Defines the Rule: Marshall's Marbury
Strategy and the Development of Supreme Court Doctrine.” Journal of Supreme
Court History 28 (2): 197-211.
130

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Loewenstern, Melissa E. 2003. “The Impartiality Paradox.” Yale Law & Policy Review 21
(2): 501-525.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Marshall, John. 1801. “Marshall to Alexander Hamilton, 1 January 1801.” 6 Marshall
Papers 46.
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
McGovney, Dudley O. 1937. “Is Hugo L. Black a Supreme Court Justice De Jure?”
California Law Review 26 (1): 1-32.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
Meier, August and John H. Bracey. 1993. “The NAACP as a Reform Movement,
1909-1965: ‘To Reach the Conscience of America.’” The Journal of Southern
History 59 (1): 3-30.
Michael, George. 2015. “A New American Populist Coalition? The Relationship between
the Tea Party and the Far Right.” The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global
Perspectives, ed. Carlos de la Torre. University Press of Kentucky.
Millhiser, Ian. 2020. “Your legal rights in a quarantine, explained.” Vox, March 25.
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/11/21166621/coronavirus-quarantines-legal-constitu
tion-new-rochelle
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Millman, Noah. 2018. “Why are right-wing populists winning everywhere?” The Week,
October 30.
https://theweek.com/articles/804453/why-are-rightwing-populists-winning-every
where
Moran, Lucille. 2019. “Notoriously Ruthless: The Idolization of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.” Macalester College Digital Commons 80: 1-70.
Moraski, Bryon J. and Charles R. Shipan. 1999. “The politics of Supreme Court
nominations: A theory of institutional constraints and choices.” American Journal
of Political Science 43 (4): 1069-1095.
Moskowitz, Daniel B. 2017. “Why Marbury Matters.” American History 52 (4): 24-25.
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Mykkeltvedt, Roald Y. 1971. “The Judicial Development of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause - Prelude to the Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights.”
Mercer Law Review 22 (2): 533-560.
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
National Labor Relations Board v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
Nester, William. 2013. “The Corrupt Bargain.” The Age of Jackson and the Art of
American Power, 1815-1848. University of Nebraska Press, Potomac Books.
Newport, Frank. 2019. “The Impact of Increased Political Polarization.” Gallup,
December 5.
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/268982/impact-increased-politica
l-polarization.aspx

131

Nguyen, Viet Thanh. 2019. “In Trump’s vision of a white America, immigrants should be
grateful and servile.” Washington Post, July 18.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/in-trumps-vision-of-a-white-america-i
mmigrants-should-be-grateful-and-servile/2019/07/18/0afb70c6-a8e3-11e9-a3a6ab670962db05_story.html
O’Brien, David. Constitutional Law and Politics. New York, NY: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US ___ (2015).
Ogletree, Charles J. 2004. All Deliberate Speed: Reflections on the First Half Century of
Brown V. Board of Education. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Olken, Samuel R. 2014. “The Decline of Legal Classicism and the Evolution of New
Deal Constitutionalism.” Notre Dame Law Review 89 (5): 2051-2092.
Orlik, Tom et al. 2020. “Coronavirus Could Cost the Global Economy $2.7 Trillion.
Here’s How.” Bloomberg, March 6.
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-coronavirus-pandemic-global-econom
ic-risk/
Ortiz, Erik. 2017. “Roger Ailes, Former Fox News CEO and Founder, Dies at 77.” NBC
News, May 18.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fox-news-ex-ceo-roger-ailes-dead-repor
ts-say-n761451
Oswald, Kristine A. 2009. “Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics.”
Marquette Law Review 77 (2): 385-414.
Page, Susan. 2018. “Brett Kavanaugh's Supreme Court Confirmation Didn't Settle This
Fight. It Ignited It.” USA Today, October 7.
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/10/07/brett-kavanaugh-confir
mation-analysis/1557826002/
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Parshall, Lisa K. 2007. “Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy's Move Away From a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional
Interpretation.” North Carolina Central Law Review 30 (1): 25-74.
Paul, Joel R. 2018. Without Precedent: John Marshall and his Times. New York, NY:
Riverhead Books.
Peter, Fabienne. 2017. “Political Legitimacy.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/
Pierson, Paul. 2017. “American hybrid: Donald Trump and the strangemerger of
populism and plutocracy.” The British Journal of Sociology 68 (S1): 105-119.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Rappaport, Kim L. 1997. “In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in
Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of
Speech Online.” American University International Law Review 13 (3): 765-814.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
132

Rockman, Seth. 2012. “The Future of Civil War Era Studies: Slavery and Capitalism.”
Journal of the Civil War Era 2 (1): 1-16.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Rose, Winfield H. 2003. “Marbury v. Madison: How John Marshall Changed History by
Misquoting the Constitution.” PS: Political Science and Politics 36 (2): 209-214.
Rosen, Jeffrey. 2017. “Not Even Andrew Jackson Went as Far as Trump in Attacking the
Courts.” The Atlantic, February 9.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/a-historical-precedent-for-tr
umps-attack-on-judges/516144/
Rosenberg, Gerald. 2008. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Rothman, Lily. 2018. “The Meaning of ‘Presumed Innocent’ has Evolved. Here's How
the Kavanaugh Hearings fit into That History.” Time Magazine, October 5.
https://time.com/5417005/presumption-of-innocence-history/
Rowland, Robert C. 2019. “The Populist and Nationalist Roots of Trump’s Rhetoric.”
Rhetoric & Public Affairs 22 (3): 343-388.
Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
Schiller, Reuel. 2007. “The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of
New Deal Administrative Law.” Michigan Law Review 106 (3): 399-442.
Schmidt, Patrick D. and David A. Yalof. 2004. “The ‘Swing Voter’ revisited: Justice
Anthony Kennedy and the first amendment right of free speech.” Political
Research Quarterly 57 (2): 209-217.
Schwartz, Michael. 2018. “The Supreme Court Used to be About Consensus, Not 5-4
Rulings.” Washington Examiner, August 31.
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/kavanaugh-confirmationhow-5-4-decisions-came-to-dominate-the-supreme-court
Segal, Jeffrey and Harold Spaeth. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
Revisited. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___ (2018).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Sherman, Gabriel. 2014. The Loudest Voice in the Room: How the Brilliant, Bombastic
Roger Ailes Built Fox News — and Divided a Country. New York, NY: Random
House Incorporated.
Shapiro, Ilya. 2019. “How the Supreme Court Undermines Its Own Legitimacy.” Cato
Institute, July 18.
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-supreme-court-undermines-it
s-own-legitimacy
Siegel, Stephen A. 1991. “Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition.” North Carolina Law Review 70 (1): 1-112.
Sill, Kaitlyn L., Emily T. Metzgar, and Stella M. Rouse. 2013. “Media Coverage of the
US Supreme Court: How do journalists assess the importance of court decisions?”
Political Communication 30 (1): 58-80.
Simon, Abigail. 2018. “Why Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Confirmation Fight Still Matters, 25
Years Later.” Time, August 3.

133

https://time.com/5357068/ruth-bader-ginsburg-anniversary-confirmation-fight-sta
ndard/
Singh, Nikhil P. 2004. Black is a Country. MA: Harvard University Press.
Snider, J.H., Matt Barranca, and Papia Debroy. 2004. “The Decline of Broadcasters’
Public Interest Obligations.” Spectrum Policy Program.
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3910-the-decline-of-broadcasters-public
-interest-obligations/Pub_File_1518_1.9616b25dbfe84cf2a361bb94c7c0e479.pdf
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
Strauss, David A. 2003. “ Why Was Lochner Wrong?” The University of Chicago Law
Review 70 (1): 373-386.
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803).
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
Tackett, Michael. 2006. “‘Impeach Earl Warren.’” Chicago Tribune, September 24.
https://www.chicagotribune.com/chinews-mtblog-2006-09-impeach_earl_warrenstory.html
Tatum, Sophie. 2018. “Brett Kavanaugh’s Nomination: A Timeline.” CNN, October.
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/10/politics/timeline-kavanaugh/
Thomson-DeVeaux, Amelia. 2018. “The Supreme Court Is Stubbornly Analog — By
Design.” FiveThirtyEight, May 29.
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-is-stubbornly-analog-by-de
sign/
Thomson-DeVeaux, Amelia. 2019. “The Supreme Court might have Three Swing
Justices Now.” FiveThirtyEight, July 2.
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-court-might-have-three-swing-jus
tices-now/
Tolbert, Caroline J. and Ramona S. McNeal. 2003. “Unraveling the Effects of the Internet
on Political Participation?” Political Research Quarterly 56 (2): 175-185.
Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018).
Turberville, Sarah and Anthony Marcum. 2018. “Those 5-to-4 decisions on the Supreme
Court? 9 to 0 is far more common.” Washington Post, June 28.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/06/28/those-5-4decisions-on-the-supreme-court-9-0-is-far-more-common/
Tushnet, Mark. 1999. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Tushnet, Mark. 2005. A Court Divided: The Rehnquist Court and the Future of
Constitutional Law. NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Urofsky, Melvin I. 2006. “Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall: What Kind of
Constitution Shall We Have?” Journal of Supreme Court History 31 (2): 109-125.
U.S. Const., 1788.
United States v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
134

United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614 (1808).
Van Alstyne, William W. 1969. “A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison.” Duke Law
Journal (1): 1-47.
Von Haldenwang, Christian. 2017. “The Relevance of Legitimation – A New Framework
for Analysis.” Contemporary Politics 23 (3): 269–286.
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Whittington, Keith. 2007. “The Judiciary in the Politics of Opposition.” Political
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and
Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History. Princeton University Press.
Whittington, Keith. 2015. “State Constitutional Law in the New Deal Period.” Rutgers
University Law Review 67 (5): 1141-1168.
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Williams, Juan. 1992. “The Survival of Racism Under the Constitution.” William & Mary
Law Review 34 (1): 7-31.
Wong, Edlie L. 2015. Racial Reconstruction: Black Inclusion, Chinese Exclusion, and the
Fictions of Citizenship. NY: New York University Press.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Wright, J. Skelly. 1968. “Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society -Judicial
Activism or Restraint.” Cornell Law Review 54 (1): 1-28.
Young, Ernest A. 2017. “Federalism as a Check on Executive Authority: State Public
Litigation, Executive Authority, and Political Polarization.” Texas Review of Law
and Politics 22 (2): 305-316.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Zackin, Emily. 2008. “Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular:
Why the ACLU Turned to Courts.” Law & Society Review 42 (2): 367-396.

135

